linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 3/4] KEYS: CA link restriction

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <ea42a31d-f62e-83e0-f66c-215d8b27b5ad@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Tue, 8 Mar 2022 08:56:57 -0500
From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
Cc:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        "dwmw2@...radead.org" <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        "herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "nayna@...ux.ibm.com" <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "mic@...ux.microsoft.com" <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] KEYS: CA link restriction



On 3/8/22 07:45, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2022-03-07 at 21:31 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>
>> On 3/7/22 18:38, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Mar 7, 2022, at 4:01 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, 2022-03-07 at 18:06 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
>>>>>>> index 6b1ac5f5896a..49bb2ea7f609 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
>>>>>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
>>>>>>> @@ -108,6 +108,49 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
>>>>>>> 	return ret;
>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>> +/**
>>>>>>> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
>>>>>>> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
>>>>>>> + * @type: The type of key being added.
>>>>>>> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
>>>>>>> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
>>>>>>> + *
>>>>>>> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
>>>>>>> + * certificate as being ok to link.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> CA = root CA here, right?
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, I’ll update the comment
>>>>
>>>> Updating the comment is not enough.  There's an existing function named
>>>> "x509_check_for_self_signed()" which determines whether the certificate
>>>> is self-signed.
>>>
>>> Originally I tried using that function.  However when the restrict link code is called,
>>> all the necessary x509 information is no longer available.   The code in
>>> restrict_link_by_ca is basically doing the equivalent to x509_check_for_self_signed.
>>> After verifying the cert has the CA flag set, the call to public_key_verify_signature
>>> validates the cert is self signed.
>>>
>> Isn't x509_cert_parse() being called as part of parsing the certificate?
>> If so, it seems to check for a self-signed certificate every time. You
>> could add something like the following to x509_check_for_self_signed(cert):
>> pub->x509_self_signed = cert->self_signed = true;
>>
>> This could then reduce the function in 3/4 to something like:
>>
>> return payload->data[asym_crypto]->x509_self_signed;
> 
> Agreed, as long as the other two criteria are also met: CA and keyUsage
> should be required and limited to keyCertSign.

right, it's not as easy as the return statement above...

> 
> thanks,
> 
> Mimi
>