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Message-ID: <Yih00gFMaJhLIgxa@iki.fi>
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 11:35:14 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Nathaniel McCallum <nathaniel@...fian.com>,
Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2.1 14/30] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave
page permissions
On Wed, Mar 09, 2022 at 10:52:22AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 04, 2022 at 11:35:08AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
> > + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm)
>
> What if this was replaced with just SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESET_PAGES, which
> would simply do EMODPR with PROT_NONE? The main ingredient of EMODPR is to
> flush out the TLB's, and move a page to pending state, which cannot be done
> from inside the enclave.
>
> It's there because of microarchitecture constraints, and less so to work as
> a reasonable permission control mechanism (actually it does terrible job on
> that side and only confuses).
>
> Once you have this magic TLB reset button in place you can just do one
> EACCEPT and EMODPE inside the enclave and you're done.
>
> This is also kind of atomic in the sense that EACCEPT free's a page with no
> rights so no misuse can happend before EMODPE has tuned EPCM.
I wonder if this type of pattern could be made work out for Graphene:
1. SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESET_PAGES
2. EACCEPT + EMODPE
This kind of delivers EMODP that everyone has been looking for.
BR, Jarkko
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