| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <20220309155856.549839867@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 16:59:50 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
"Russell King (Oracle)" <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 13/18] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs
From: "Russell King (Oracle)" <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
commit 9dd78194a3722fa6712192cdd4f7032d45112a9a upstream.
As per other architectures, add support for reporting the Spectre
vulnerability status via sysfs CPU.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
[ preserve res variable and add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED - gregkh ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h | 28 ++++++++
arch/arm/kernel/Makefile | 2
arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++
arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 1
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
5 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h
create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+#ifndef __ASM_SPECTRE_H
+#define __ASM_SPECTRE_H
+
+enum {
+ SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED,
+ SPECTRE_MITIGATED,
+ SPECTRE_VULNERABLE,
+};
+
+enum {
+ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL,
+ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU,
+ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC,
+ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC,
+};
+
+enum {
+ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL),
+ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU),
+ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC),
+ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC),
+};
+
+void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int methods);
+
+#endif
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile
@@ -106,4 +106,6 @@ endif
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_SMCCC) += smccc-call.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) += spectre.o
+
extra-y := $(head-y) vmlinux.lds
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+}
+
+static unsigned int spectre_v2_state;
+static unsigned int spectre_v2_methods;
+
+void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int method)
+{
+ if (state > spectre_v2_state)
+ spectre_v2_state = state;
+ spectre_v2_methods |= method;
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ const char *method;
+
+ if (spectre_v2_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Not affected");
+
+ if (spectre_v2_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Vulnerable");
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_methods) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
+ method = "Branch predictor hardening";
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU:
+ method = "I-cache invalidation";
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC:
+ method = "Firmware call";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ method = "Multiple mitigations";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s\n", method);
+}
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -823,6 +823,7 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
config CPU_SPECTRE
bool
+ select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
@@ -7,8 +7,36 @@
#include <asm/cp15.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
#include <asm/system_misc.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+#define SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED 1
+static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
+{
+ struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+ arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+ ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+
+ switch ((int)res.a0) {
+ case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
+ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+
+ case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED:
+ return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
+
+ default:
+ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+ }
+}
+#else
+static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
+{
+ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
@@ -37,13 +65,60 @@ static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch
arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
}
-static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
+static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
{
const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
if (per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu))
- return;
+ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+
+ switch (method) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
+ per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+ harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
+ spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU:
+ per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+ harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
+ spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC:
+ per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+ call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
+ cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
+ spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC:
+ per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+ call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
+ cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
+ spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (spectre_v2_method)
+ pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
+ smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
+
+ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+}
+#else
+static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
+{
+ pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n");
+
+ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int state, method = 0;
switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A8:
@@ -52,32 +127,37 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
- per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
- harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
- spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
+ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL;
break;
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
- per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
- harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
- spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
+ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU;
break;
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B53:
/* Requires no workaround */
+ state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
break;
+
default:
/* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */
- if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM)
+ if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM) {
+ state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
break;
+ }
/* fallthrough */
- /* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
+ /* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: {
struct arm_smccc_res res;
+ state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
+ if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
+ break;
+
if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
break;
@@ -87,10 +167,7 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
break;
- per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
- call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
- cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
- spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
+ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC;
break;
case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
@@ -98,28 +175,21 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
break;
- per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
- call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
- cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
- spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
+ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC;
break;
default:
+ state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
break;
}
}
-#endif
}
- if (spectre_v2_method)
- pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
- smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
-}
-#else
-static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
-{
+ if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
+ state = spectre_v2_install_workaround(method);
+
+ spectre_v2_update_state(state, method);
}
-#endif
static __maybe_unused bool cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
u32 mask, const char *msg)
@@ -149,16 +219,16 @@ static bool check_spectre_auxcr(bool *wa
void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
{
if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6)))
- cpu_v7_spectre_init();
+ cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
}
void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
{
if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0)))
- cpu_v7_spectre_init();
+ cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
}
void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
{
- cpu_v7_spectre_init();
+ cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
}
Powered by blists - more mailing lists