linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.4 17/33] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20220310140809.250185790@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:19:18 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        "Russell King (Oracle)" <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 17/33] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting

From: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>

commit 25875aa71dfefd1959f07e626c4d285b88b27ac2 upstream.

The mitigations for Spectre-BHB are only applied when an exception
is taken, but when unprivileged BPF is enabled, userspace can
load BPF programs that can be used to exploit the problem.

When unprivileged BPF is enabled, report the vulnerable status via
the spectre_v2 sysfs file.

Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c
@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
 
 #include <asm/spectre.h>
 
+static bool _unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
+#else
+	return false
+#endif
+}
+
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			    char *buf)
 {
@@ -31,6 +41,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
 	if (spectre_v2_state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Vulnerable");
 
+	if (_unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n");
+
 	switch (spectre_v2_methods) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
 		method = "Branch predictor hardening";