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Message-Id: <20220310140808.224709493@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:18:43 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
"Russell King (Oracle)" <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 16/33] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround
From: "Russell King (Oracle)" <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
commit b9baf5c8c5c356757f4f9d8180b5e9d234065bc3 upstream.
Workaround the Spectre BHB issues for Cortex-A15, Cortex-A57,
Cortex-A72, Cortex-A73 and Cortex-A75. We also include Brahma B15 as
well to be safe, which is affected by Spectre V2 in the same ways as
Cortex-A15.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
[changes due to lack of SYSTEM_FREEING_INITMEM - gregkh]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h | 10 ++++
arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h | 4 +
arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 24 +++++++++++
arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c | 4 +
arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.h | 18 +++++++-
arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 10 ++++
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
9 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -110,6 +110,16 @@
.endm
#endif
+#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 7
+ .macro dsb, args
+ mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c10, 4
+ .endm
+
+ .macro isb, args
+ mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, r5, 4
+ .endm
+#endif
+
.macro asm_trace_hardirqs_off, save=1
#if defined(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS)
.if \save
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/spectre.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ enum {
__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU,
__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC,
__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC,
+ __SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8,
};
enum {
@@ -21,8 +22,11 @@ enum {
SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU),
SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC),
SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC),
+ SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8 = BIT(__SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8),
};
void spectre_v2_update_state(unsigned int state, unsigned int methods);
+int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method);
+
#endif
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S
@@ -1029,12 +1029,11 @@ vector_\name:
sub lr, lr, #\correction
.endif
- @
- @ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC) and spsr_<exception>
- @ (parent CPSR)
- @
+ @ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC)
stmia sp, {r0, lr} @ save r0, lr
- mrs lr, spsr
+
+ @ Save spsr_<exception> (parent CPSR)
+2: mrs lr, spsr
str lr, [sp, #8] @ save spsr
@
@@ -1055,6 +1054,44 @@ vector_\name:
movs pc, lr @ branch to handler in SVC mode
ENDPROC(vector_\name)
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+ .subsection 1
+ .align 5
+vector_bhb_loop8_\name:
+ .if \correction
+ sub lr, lr, #\correction
+ .endif
+
+ @ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC)
+ stmia sp, {r0, lr}
+
+ @ bhb workaround
+ mov r0, #8
+1: b . + 4
+ subs r0, r0, #1
+ bne 1b
+ dsb
+ isb
+ b 2b
+ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_\name)
+
+vector_bhb_bpiall_\name:
+ .if \correction
+ sub lr, lr, #\correction
+ .endif
+
+ @ Save r0, lr_<exception> (parent PC)
+ stmia sp, {r0, lr}
+
+ @ bhb workaround
+ mcr p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6 @ BPIALL
+ @ isb not needed due to "movs pc, lr" in the vector stub
+ @ which gives a "context synchronisation".
+ b 2b
+ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_\name)
+ .previous
+#endif
+
.align 2
@ handler addresses follow this label
1:
@@ -1063,6 +1100,10 @@ ENDPROC(vector_\name)
.section .stubs, "ax", %progbits
@ This must be the first word
.word vector_swi
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+ .word vector_bhb_loop8_swi
+ .word vector_bhb_bpiall_swi
+#endif
vector_rst:
ARM( swi SYS_ERROR0 )
@@ -1177,8 +1218,10 @@ vector_addrexcptn:
* FIQ "NMI" handler
*-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Handle a FIQ using the SVC stack allowing FIQ act like NMI on x86
- * systems.
+ * systems. This must be the last vector stub, so lets place it in its own
+ * subsection.
*/
+ .subsection 2
vector_stub fiq, FIQ_MODE, 4
.long __fiq_usr @ 0 (USR_26 / USR_32)
@@ -1211,6 +1254,30 @@ vector_addrexcptn:
W(b) vector_irq
W(b) vector_fiq
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+ .section .vectors.bhb.loop8, "ax", %progbits
+.L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start:
+ W(b) vector_rst
+ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_und
+ W(ldr) pc, .L__vectors_bhb_loop8_start + 0x1004
+ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_pabt
+ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_dabt
+ W(b) vector_addrexcptn
+ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_irq
+ W(b) vector_bhb_loop8_fiq
+
+ .section .vectors.bhb.bpiall, "ax", %progbits
+.L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start:
+ W(b) vector_rst
+ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_und
+ W(ldr) pc, .L__vectors_bhb_bpiall_start + 0x1008
+ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_pabt
+ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_dabt
+ W(b) vector_addrexcptn
+ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_irq
+ W(b) vector_bhb_bpiall_fiq
+#endif
+
.data
.align 2
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -166,12 +166,36 @@ ENDPROC(ret_from_fork)
*/
.align 5
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+ENTRY(vector_bhb_loop8_swi)
+ sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
+ stmia sp, {r0 - r12}
+ mov r8, #8
+1: b 2f
+2: subs r8, r8, #1
+ bne 1b
+ dsb
+ isb
+ b 3f
+ENDPROC(vector_bhb_loop8_swi)
+
+ .align 5
+ENTRY(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi)
+ sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
+ stmia sp, {r0 - r12}
+ mcr p15, 0, r8, c7, c5, 6 @ BPIALL
+ isb
+ b 3f
+ENDPROC(vector_bhb_bpiall_swi)
+#endif
+ .align 5
ENTRY(vector_swi)
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_V7M
v7m_exception_entry
#else
sub sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE
stmia sp, {r0 - r12} @ Calling r0 - r12
+3:
ARM( add r8, sp, #S_PC )
ARM( stmdb r8, {sp, lr}^ ) @ Calling sp, lr
THUMB( mov r8, sp )
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/spectre.c
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
method = "Firmware call";
break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
+ method = "History overwrite";
+ break;
+
default:
method = "Multiple mitigations";
break;
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/exception.h>
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -844,6 +845,43 @@ static void flush_vectors(void *vma, siz
flush_icache_range(start, end);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+int spectre_bhb_update_vectors(unsigned int method)
+{
+ extern char __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start[], __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end[];
+ extern char __vectors_bhb_loop8_start[], __vectors_bhb_loop8_end[];
+ void *vec_start, *vec_end;
+
+ if (system_state > SYSTEM_SCHEDULING) {
+ pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB workaround too late - system vulnerable\n",
+ smp_processor_id());
+ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+ }
+
+ switch (method) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
+ vec_start = __vectors_bhb_loop8_start;
+ vec_end = __vectors_bhb_loop8_end;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
+ vec_start = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_start;
+ vec_end = __vectors_bhb_bpiall_end;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ pr_err("CPU%u: unknown Spectre BHB state %d\n",
+ smp_processor_id(), method);
+ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+ }
+
+ copy_from_lma(vectors_page, vec_start, vec_end);
+ flush_vectors(vectors_page, 0, vec_end - vec_start);
+
+ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+}
+#endif
+
void __init early_trap_init(void *vectors_base)
{
extern char __stubs_start[], __stubs_end[];
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -106,11 +106,23 @@
*/
#define ARM_VECTORS \
__vectors_lma = .; \
- .vectors 0xffff0000 : AT(__vectors_start) { \
- *(.vectors) \
+ OVERLAY 0xffff0000 : NOCROSSREFS AT(__vectors_lma) { \
+ .vectors { \
+ *(.vectors) \
+ } \
+ .vectors.bhb.loop8 { \
+ *(.vectors.bhb.loop8) \
+ } \
+ .vectors.bhb.bpiall { \
+ *(.vectors.bhb.bpiall) \
+ } \
} \
ARM_LMA(__vectors, .vectors); \
- . = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors); \
+ ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_loop8, .vectors.bhb.loop8); \
+ ARM_LMA(__vectors_bhb_bpiall, .vectors.bhb.bpiall); \
+ . = __vectors_lma + SIZEOF(.vectors) + \
+ SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.loop8) + \
+ SIZEOF(.vectors.bhb.bpiall); \
\
__stubs_lma = .; \
.stubs ADDR(.vectors) + 0x1000 : AT(__stubs_lma) { \
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -844,6 +844,16 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
If unsure, say Y.
+config HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+ bool "Harden Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT
+ depends on CPU_SPECTRE
+ default y
+ help
+ Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
+ make use of branch history to influence future speculation. When
+ taking an exception, a sequence of branches overwrites the branch
+ history, or branch history is invalidated.
+
config TLS_REG_EMUL
bool
select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
@@ -191,6 +191,81 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(void)
spectre_v2_update_state(state, method);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
+static int spectre_bhb_method;
+
+static const char *spectre_bhb_method_name(int method)
+{
+ switch (method) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
+ return "loop";
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
+ return "BPIALL";
+
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+}
+
+static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method)
+{
+ if (spectre_bhb_method != method) {
+ if (spectre_bhb_method) {
+ pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: method disagreement, system vulnerable\n",
+ smp_processor_id());
+
+ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+ }
+
+ if (spectre_bhb_update_vectors(method) == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
+ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+
+ spectre_bhb_method = method;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: using %s workaround\n",
+ smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method));
+
+ return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+}
+#else
+static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method)
+{
+ return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int state, method = 0;
+
+ switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
+ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+ case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
+ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72:
+ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8;
+ break;
+
+ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
+ case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
+ state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+ method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
+ state = spectre_bhb_install_workaround(method);
+
+ spectre_v2_update_state(state, method);
+}
+
static __maybe_unused bool cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
u32 mask, const char *msg)
{
@@ -231,4 +306,5 @@ void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
{
cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
+ cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init();
}
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