linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 11 Mar 2022 15:52:54 -0500
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>,
        Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Cc:     Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
        David Anderson <dvander@...gle.com>,
        Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        overlayfs <linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        kernel-team <kernel-team@...roid.com>, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
        paulmoore@...rosoft.com, luca.boccassi@...rosoft.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix

On Fri, Mar 11, 2022 at 9:01 AM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 11, 2022 at 06:09:56AM +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > Hi Paul,

Hi Amir, Vivek,

Thanks for the replies, I think I now have a better understanding of
the concerns which is starting to make the path forward a bit more
clear.  A few more comments below ...

> > In this thread I claimed that the authors of the patches did not present
> > a security model for overlayfs, such as the one currently in overlayfs.rst.
> > If we had a model we could have debated its correctness and review its
> > implementation.
>
> Agreed. After going through the patch set, I was wondering what's the
> overall security model and how to visualize that.
>
> So probably there needs to be a documentation patch which explains
> what's the new security model and how does it work.

Yes, of course.  I'll be sure to add a section to the existing docs.

> Also think both in terms of DAC and MAC. (Instead of just focussing too
> hard on SELinux).

Definitely.  Most of what I've been thinking about the past day or so
has been how to properly handle some of the DAC/capability issues; I
have yet to start playing with the code, but for the most part I think
the MAC/SELinux bits are already working properly.

> My understanding is that in current model, some of the overlayfs
> operations require priviliges. So mounter is supposed to be priviliged
> and does the operation on underlying layers.
>
> Now in this new model, there will be two levels of check. Both overlay
> level and underlying layer checks will happen in the context of task
> which is doing the operation. So first of all, all tasks will need
> to have enough priviliges to be able to perform various operations
> on lower layer.
>
> If we do checks at both the levels in with the creds of calling task,
> I guess that probably is fine. (But will require a closer code inspection
> to make sure there is no privilege escalation both for mounter as well
> calling task).

I have thoughts on this, but I don't think I'm yet in a position to
debate this in depth just yet; I still need to finish poking around
the code and playing with a few things :)

It may take some time before I'm back with patches, but I appreciate
all of the tips and insight - thank you!

-- 
paul-moore.com