linux-kernel - Re: [RESEND PATCH v3 2/5] x86/mm: check exec permissions on fault

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Message-Id: <E46E0DA7-6427-4733-9D43-6CC1107194D6@gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 11 Mar 2022 13:16:59 -0800
From:   Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc:     Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Yu Zhao <yuzhao@...gle.com>,
        Nick Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH v3 2/5] x86/mm: check exec permissions on fault



> On Mar 11, 2022, at 12:59 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
> 
> On 3/11/22 12:38, Nadav Amit wrote:
>>> On Mar 11, 2022, at 11:41 AM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
> ...
>>> Can any sane code trigger this?
>> 
>> Well, regarding this question and the previous one: I do not think that
>> this scenario is possible today since mprotect() holds the mmap_lock
>> for write. There is no other code that I am aware of that toggles
>> the NX bit on a present entry.
>> 
>> But I will not bet my life on it. That’s the reason for the somewhat
>> vague phrasing that I used.
> 
> From the userspace perspective, mmap(MAP_FIXED) can do this too.  But,
> sane userspace can't rely on the syscall to have done any work and the
> TLB flushing is currently done before the syscall returns.
> 
> I'd put it this way:
> 
> 	Today, it is possible for a thread to end up in access_error()
> 	for a PF_INSN fault and observe a VM_EXEC VMA.  If you are
> 	generous, this could be considered a spurious fault.
> 
> 	However, the faulting thread would have had to race with the
> 	thread which was changing the PTE and the VMA and is currently
> 	*in* mprotect() (or some other syscall).  In other words, the
> 	faulting thread can encounter this situation, but it never had
> 	any assurance from the kernel that it wouldn't fault.  This is
> 	because the faulting thread never had a chance to observe the
> 	syscall return.
> 
> 	There is no evidence that the existing behavior can cause any
> 	issues with sane userspace.

Done. Thanks.

> 
>>>> index d0074c6ed31a..ad0ef0a6087a 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
>>>> @@ -1107,10 +1107,28 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>>>> 				       (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
>>>> 		return 1;
>>>> 
>>>> -	if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) {
>>>> +	if (error_code & (X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_INSTR)) {
>>>> +		/*
>>>> +		 * CPUs are not expected to set the two error code bits
>>>> +		 * together, but to ensure that hypervisors do not misbehave,
>>>> +		 * run an additional sanity check.
>>>> +		 */
>>>> +		if ((error_code & (X86_PF_WRITE|X86_PF_INSTR)) ==
>>>> +					(X86_PF_WRITE|X86_PF_INSTR)) {
>>>> +			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>>> +			return 1;
>>>> +		}
>>> 
>>> access_error() is only used on the do_user_addr_fault() side of things.
>>> Can we stick this check somewhere that also works for kernel address
>>> faults?  This is a generic sanity check.  It can also be in a separate
>>> patch.
>> 
>> I can wrap it in a different function and also call it from
>> do_kern_addr_fault() or spurious_kernel_fault().
>> 
>> Anyhow, spurious_kernel_fault() should handle spurious faults on
>> executable code correctly. 
> 
> This is really about checking the sanity of the "hardware"-provided
> error code.  Let's just do it in  handle_page_fault(), maybe hidden in a
> function like:
> 
> void check_error_code_sanity(unsigned long error_code)
> {
> 	WARN_ON_ONCE(...);
> }
> 
> You can leave the X86_PF_PK check in place for now.  It's probably going
> away soon anyway.

Done. Thanks. But note that removing the check from access_error() means
that if the assertion is broken, userspace might crash inadvertently
(in contrast to the version I sent, which would have potentially led to
infinite stream of page-faults). I don’t know which behavior is better,
so let’s go with your version and just hope it doesn’t happen.

> 
>>> Also, we should *probably* stop talking about CPUs here.  If there's
>>> ever something wonky with error code bits, I'd put my money on a weird
>>> hypervisor before any kind of CPU issue.
>> 
>> I thought I manage to convey exactly that in the comment. Can you provide
>> a better phrasing?
> 
> Maybe:
> 
> 	/*
> 	 * X86_PF_INSTR for instruction _fetches_.  Fetches never write.
> 	 * X86_PF_WRITE should never be set with X86_PF_INSTR.
> 	 *
> 	 * This is most likely due to a buggy hypervisor.
> 	 */

Done, thank you.