linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] ceph: add support for snapshot names encryption

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Message-ID: <a4d26edc-a65f-27e2-2ea9-ef43f364eb9b@redhat.com>
Date:   Thu, 17 Mar 2022 20:31:30 +0800
From:   Xiubo Li <xiubli@...hat.com>
To:     Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        Luís Henriques <lhenriques@...e.de>
Cc:     Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@...il.com>,
        Ceph Development <ceph-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] ceph: add support for snapshot names
 encryption


On 3/17/22 8:01 PM, Jeff Layton wrote:
> On Thu, 2022-03-17 at 11:11 +0000, Luís Henriques wrote:
>> Xiubo Li <xiubli@...hat.com> writes:
>>
>>> On 3/17/22 6:01 PM, Jeff Layton wrote:
>>>> I'm not sure we want to worry about .snap directories here since they
>>>> aren't "real". IIRC, snaps are inherited from parents too, so you could
>>>> do something like
>>>>
>>>>       mkdir dir1
>>>>       mkdir dir1/.snap/snap1
>>>>       mkdir dir1/dir2
>>>>       fscrypt encrypt dir1/dir2
>>>>
>>>> There should be nothing to prevent encrypting dir2, but I'm pretty sure
>>>> dir2/.snap will not be empty at that point.
>>> If we don't take care of this. Then we don't know which snapshots should do
>>> encrypt/dencrypt and which shouldn't when building the path in lookup and when
>>> reading the snapdir ?
>> In my patchset (which I plan to send a new revision later today, I think I
>> still need to rebase it) this is handled by using the *real* snapshot
>> parent inode.  If we're decrypting/encrypting a name for a snapshot that
>> starts with a '_' character, we first find the parent inode for that
>> snapshot and only do the operation if that parent is encrypted.
>>
>> In the other email I suggested that we could prevent enabling encryption
>> in a directory when there are snapshots above in the hierarchy.  But now
>> that I think more about it, it won't solve any problem because you could
>> create those snapshots later and then you would still need to handle these
>> (non-encrypted) "_name_xxxx" snapshots anyway.
>>
> Yeah, that sounds about right.
>
> What happens if you don't have the snapshot parent's inode in cache?
> That can happen if you (e.g.) are running NFS over ceph, or if you get
> crafty with name_to_handle_at() and open_by_handle_at().
>
> Do we have to do a LOOKUPINO in that case or does the trace contain that
> info? If it doesn't then that could really suck in a big hierarchy if
> there are a lot of different snapshot parent inodes to hunt down.
>
> I think this is a case where the client just doesn't have complete
> control over the dentry name. It may be better to just not encrypt them
> if it's too ugly.
>
> Another idea might be to just use the same parent inode (maybe the
> root?) for all snapshot names. It's not as secure, but it's probably
> better than nothing.

Does it allow to have different keys for the subdirs in the hierarchy ? 
 From my test it doesn't.

If so we can always use the same oldest ancestor in the hierarchy, who 
has encryption key, to encyrpt/decrypt all the .snap in the hierarchy, 
then just need to lookup oldest ancestor inode only once.

-- Xiubo