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Message-ID: <61d831de-1589-3a19-8f46-a162099e75df@redhat.com>
Date:   Fri, 18 Mar 2022 12:57:34 +0800
From:   Xiubo Li <xiubli@...hat.com>
To:     Luís Henriques <lhenriques@...e.de>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@...il.com>
Cc:     ceph-devel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] ceph: handle encrypted snapshot names in
 subdirectories


On 3/17/22 11:45 PM, Luís Henriques wrote:
> When creating a snapshot, the .snap directories for every subdirectory will
> show the snapshot name in the "long format":
>
>    # mkdir .snap/my-snap
>    # ls my-dir/.snap/
>    _my-snap_1099511627782
>
> Encrypted snapshots will need to be able to handle these snapshot names by
> encrypting/decrypting only the snapshot part of the string ('my-snap').
>
> Also, since the MDS prevents snapshot names to be bigger than 240 characters
> it is necessary to adapt CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX to accommodate this extra
> limitation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@...e.de>
> ---
>   fs/ceph/crypto.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>   fs/ceph/crypto.h |  11 ++-
>   2 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
> index beb73bbdd868..caa9863dee93 100644
> --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c
> +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
> @@ -128,16 +128,100 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_se
>   	swap(req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth);
>   }
>   
> -int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf)
> +/*
> + * User-created snapshots can't start with '_'.  Snapshots that start with this
> + * character are special (hint: there aren't real snapshots) and use the
> + * following format:
> + *
> + *   _<SNAPSHOT-NAME>_<INODE-NUMBER>
> + *
> + * where:
> + *  - <SNAPSHOT-NAME> - the real snapshot name that may need to be decrypted,
> + *  - <INODE-NUMBER> - the inode number for the actual snapshot
> + *
> + * This function parses these snapshot names and returns the inode
> + * <INODE-NUMBER>.  'name_len' will also bet set with the <SNAPSHOT-NAME>
> + * length.
> + */
> +static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, const char *name,
> +				    int *name_len)
>   {
> +	struct inode *dir = NULL;
> +	struct ceph_vino vino = { .snap = CEPH_NOSNAP };
> +	char *inode_number;
> +	char *name_end;
> +	int orig_len = *name_len;
> +	int ret = -EIO;
> +
> +	/* Skip initial '_' */
> +	name++;
> +	name_end = strrchr(name, '_');
> +	if (!name_end) {
> +		dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", name);
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
> +	}
> +	*name_len = (name_end - name);
> +	if (*name_len <= 0) {
> +		pr_err("Failed to parse long snapshot name\n");
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Get the inode number */
> +	inode_number = kmemdup_nul(name_end + 1,
> +				   orig_len - *name_len - 2,
> +				   GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!inode_number)
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +	ret = kstrtou64(inode_number, 0, &vino.ino);
> +	if (ret) {
> +		dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", name);
> +		dir = ERR_PTR(ret);
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* And finally the inode */
> +	dir = ceph_find_inode(parent->i_sb, vino);
> +	if (!dir) {
> +		/* This can happen if we're not mounting cephfs on the root */
> +		dir = ceph_get_inode(parent->i_sb, vino, NULL);

In this case IMO you should lookup the inode from MDS instead create it 
in the cache, which won't setup the encryption info needed.

So later when you try to use this to dencrypt the snapshot names, you 
will hit errors ? And also the case Jeff mentioned in previous thread 
could happen.

I figured out another approach could resolve this more gracefully:

For all the subdirs just let them inherit the encryption info from the 
same ancestor, which is initially encrypted, then in ceph_new_inode() 
you can just skip setting up the encryption info for all the subdirs and 
in MDS side will send back the parent's encryption info and fill it in 
handle_reply(), this is just what the .snap does.

Then here you can use current inode to do the dencryption for all the 
snapshots including the long snapshot names.

I have raise one PR and send a kclient patch for the above basic 
framework [1][2]. But there still need a little more work you need to do 
based them:

When lssnap you need to add one flag in LeaseStat to tell the kclient 
whether the long snap names are encrypted, this is very easy in MDS 
side. Then in kclient side you can just skip dencrypting the long snap 
names which are from none-encyrpted parents and for all the other just 
use current inode to do the dencryption. No need to search the parent 
inodes for long snaps.

And when lookuping a long snap name, which could be encyrpted and could 
be not, then you need to parse the inode out and lookup the inode from 
MDS if it does not exist in cache.


[1] https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/45516

[2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/ceph-devel/list/?series=624492


> +		if (!dir)
> +			dir = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> +	}
> +	if (IS_ERR(dir))
> +		dout("Can't find inode %s (%s)\n", inode_number, name);
> +
> +out:
> +	kfree(inode_number);
> +	return dir;
> +}
> +
> +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf)
> +{
> +	struct inode *dir = parent;
> +	struct qstr iname;
>   	u32 len;
> +	int name_len;
>   	int elen;
>   	int ret;
> -	u8 *cryptbuf;
> +	u8 *cryptbuf = NULL;
> +
> +	iname.name = d_name->name;
> +	name_len = d_name->len;
> +
> +	/* Handle the special case of snapshot names that start with '_' */
> +	if ((ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) && (name_len > 0) &&
> +	    (iname.name[0] == '_')) {
> +		dir = parse_longname(parent, iname.name, &name_len);
> +		if (IS_ERR(dir))
> +			return PTR_ERR(dir);
> +		iname.name++; /* skip initial '_' */
> +	}
> +	iname.len = name_len;
>   
> -	if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)) {
> +	if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) {
>   		memcpy(buf, d_name->name, d_name->len);
> -		return d_name->len;
> +		elen = d_name->len;
> +		goto out;
>   	}
>   
>   	/*
> @@ -146,18 +230,22 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name,
>   	 *
>   	 * See: fscrypt_setup_filename
>   	 */
> -	if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(parent, d_name->len, NAME_MAX, &len))
> -		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
> +	if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(dir, iname.len, NAME_MAX, &len)) {
> +		elen = -ENAMETOOLONG;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
>   
>   	/* Allocate a buffer appropriate to hold the result */
>   	cryptbuf = kmalloc(len > CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ? NAME_MAX : len, GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!cryptbuf)
> -		return -ENOMEM;
> +	if (!cryptbuf) {
> +		elen = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
>   
> -	ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(parent, d_name, cryptbuf, len);
> +	ret = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(dir, &iname, cryptbuf, len);
>   	if (ret) {
> -		kfree(cryptbuf);
> -		return ret;
> +		elen = ret;
> +		goto out;
>   	}
>   
>   	/* hash the end if the name is long enough */
> @@ -173,12 +261,29 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name,
>   
>   	/* base64 encode the encrypted name */
>   	elen = fscrypt_base64url_encode(cryptbuf, len, buf);
> -	kfree(cryptbuf);
>   	dout("base64-encoded ciphertext name = %.*s\n", elen, buf);
> +
> +	WARN_ON(elen > (CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE));
> +	if ((elen > 0) && (dir != parent)) {
> +		char tmp_buf[NAME_MAX];
> +
> +		elen = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%ld",
> +				elen, buf, dir->i_ino);
> +		memcpy(buf, tmp_buf, elen);
> +	}
> +
> +out:
> +	kfree(cryptbuf);
> +	if (dir != parent) {
> +		if ((dir->i_state & I_NEW))
> +			discard_new_inode(dir);
> +		else
> +			iput(dir);
> +	}
>   	return elen;
>   }
>   
> -int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf)
> +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf)
>   {
>   	WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent));
>   
> @@ -203,29 +308,42 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentr
>   int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
>   		      struct fscrypt_str *oname, bool *is_nokey)
>   {
> -	int ret;
> +	struct inode *dir = fname->dir;
>   	struct fscrypt_str _tname = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0);
>   	struct fscrypt_str iname;
> -
> -	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(fname->dir)) {
> -		oname->name = fname->name;
> -		oname->len = fname->name_len;
> -		return 0;
> -	}
> +	char *name = fname->name;
> +	int name_len = fname->name_len;
> +	int ret;
>   
>   	/* Sanity check that the resulting name will fit in the buffer */
>   	if (fname->name_len > NAME_MAX || fname->ctext_len > NAME_MAX)
>   		return -EIO;
>   
> -	ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(fname->dir);
> +	/* Handle the special case of snapshot names that start with '_' */
> +	if ((ceph_snap(dir) == CEPH_SNAPDIR) && (name_len > 0) &&
> +	    (name[0] == '_')) {
> +		dir = parse_longname(dir, name, &name_len);
> +		if (IS_ERR(dir))
> +			return PTR_ERR(dir);
> +		name++; /* skip initial '_' */
> +	}
> +
> +	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) {
> +		oname->name = fname->name;
> +		oname->len = fname->name_len;
> +		ret = 0;
> +		goto out_inode;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(dir);
>   	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> +		goto out_inode;
>   
>   	/*
>   	 * Use the raw dentry name as sent by the MDS instead of
>   	 * generating a nokey name via fscrypt.
>   	 */
> -	if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(fname->dir)) {
> +	if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) {
>   		if (fname->no_copy)
>   			oname->name = fname->name;
>   		else
> @@ -233,7 +351,8 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
>   		oname->len = fname->name_len;
>   		if (is_nokey)
>   			*is_nokey = true;
> -		return 0;
> +		ret = 0;
> +		goto out_inode;
>   	}
>   
>   	if (fname->ctext_len == 0) {
> @@ -242,11 +361,11 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
>   		if (!tname) {
>   			ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX, &_tname);
>   			if (ret)
> -				return ret;
> +				goto out_inode;
>   			tname = &_tname;
>   		}
>   
> -		declen = fscrypt_base64url_decode(fname->name, fname->name_len, tname->name);
> +		declen = fscrypt_base64url_decode(name, name_len, tname->name);
>   		if (declen <= 0) {
>   			ret = -EIO;
>   			goto out;
> @@ -258,9 +377,25 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
>   		iname.len = fname->ctext_len;
>   	}
>   
> -	ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(fname->dir, 0, 0, &iname, oname);
> +	ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(dir, 0, 0, &iname, oname);
> +	if (!ret && (dir != fname->dir)) {
> +		char tmp_buf[FSCRYPT_BASE64URL_CHARS(NAME_MAX)];
> +
> +		name_len = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%ld",
> +				    oname->len, oname->name, dir->i_ino);
> +		memcpy(oname->name, tmp_buf, name_len);
> +		oname->len = name_len;
> +	}
> +
>   out:
>   	fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&_tname);
> +out_inode:
> +	if ((dir != fname->dir) && !IS_ERR(dir)) {
> +		if ((dir->i_state & I_NEW))
> +			discard_new_inode(dir);
> +		else
> +			iput(dir);
> +	}
>   	return ret;
>   }
>   
> diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h
> index 62f0ddd30dee..3273d076a9e5 100644
> --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h
> +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h
> @@ -82,13 +82,16 @@ static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_len(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fa)
>    * struct fscrypt_ceph_nokey_name {
>    *	u8 bytes[157];
>    *	u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - * }; // 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255)
> + * }; // 180 bytes => 240 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255)
> + *
> + * (240 bytes is the maximum size allowed for snapshot names to take into
> + *  account the format: '_<SNAPSHOT-NAME>_<INODE-NUMBER>'.)
>    *
>    * Note that for long names that end up having their tail portion hashed, we
>    * must also store the full encrypted name (in the dentry's alternate_name
>    * field).
>    */
> -#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (189 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
> +#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (180 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
>   
>   void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb);
>   
> @@ -97,8 +100,8 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc);
>   int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
>   				 struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as);
>   void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as);
> -int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(const struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf);
> -int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf);
> +int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, struct qstr *d_name, char *buf);
> +int ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dentry, char *buf);
>   
>   static inline int ceph_fname_alloc_buffer(struct inode *parent, struct fscrypt_str *fname)
>   {
>

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