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Message-Id: <20220319163010.101686-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2022 18:30:10 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
x86@...nel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org (open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND
64-BIT))
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sgx: Allow RW for TCS pages
Not allowing to set RW for added TCS pages leads only to a special case
to be handled in the user space run-time. Thus, allow permissions to be
set RW. Originally, it would have probably made more sense to check up
that the permissions are RW.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index 83df20e3e633..f79761ad0400 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)
* CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means
* that we need to validate it ourselves.
*/
- if (pt == SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm)
+ if (pt == SGX_SECINFO_TCS && (perm != 0 || perm != (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)))
return -EINVAL;
if (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK)
--
2.35.1
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