linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 3/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Factor shadow_zero_check out of __make

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Message-Id: <20220321224358.1305530-4-bgardon@google.com>
Date:   Mon, 21 Mar 2022 15:43:52 -0700
From:   Ben Gardon <bgardon@...gle.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        David Dunn <daviddunn@...gle.com>,
        Jing Zhang <jingzhangos@...gle.com>,
        Junaid Shahid <junaids@...gle.com>,
        Ben Gardon <bgardon@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Factor shadow_zero_check out of __make_spte

In the interest of devloping a version of __make_spte that can function
without a vCPU pointer, factor out the shadow_zero_mask to be an
additional argument to the function.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@...gle.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 931cf93c3b7e..ef2d85577abb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ bool __make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
 		 const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned int pte_access,
 		 gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, u64 old_spte, bool prefetch,
 		 bool can_unsync, bool host_writable, u64 mt_mask,
-		 u64 *new_spte)
+		 struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_zero_check, u64 *new_spte)
 {
 	int level = sp->role.level;
 	u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;
@@ -177,9 +177,9 @@ bool __make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
 	if (prefetch)
 		spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);
 
-	WARN_ONCE(is_rsvd_spte(&vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check, spte, level),
+	WARN_ONCE(is_rsvd_spte(shadow_zero_check, spte, level),
 		  "spte = 0x%llx, level = %d, rsvd bits = 0x%llx", spte, level,
-		  get_rsvd_bits(&vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check, spte, level));
+		  get_rsvd_bits(shadow_zero_check, spte, level));
 
 	if ((spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK) && kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(slot)) {
 		/* Enforced by kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust. */
@@ -199,10 +199,12 @@ bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
 {
 	u64 mt_mask = static_call(kvm_x86_get_mt_mask)(vcpu, gfn,
 						       kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn));
+	struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_zero_check =
+			&vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check;
 
 	return __make_spte(vcpu, sp, slot, pte_access, gfn, pfn, old_spte,
 			   prefetch, can_unsync, host_writable, mt_mask,
-			   new_spte);
+			   shadow_zero_check, new_spte);
 
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index d051f955699e..e8a051188eb6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ bool __make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
 		 const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned int pte_access,
 		 gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, u64 old_spte, bool prefetch,
 		 bool can_unsync, bool host_writable, u64 mt_mask,
-		 u64 *new_spte);
+		 struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_zero_check, u64 *new_spte);
 bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
 	       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 	       unsigned int pte_access, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
-- 
2.35.1.894.gb6a874cedc-goog