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Message-ID: <YjsTOsqiNaURZQLM@mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 08:31:54 -0400
From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Guenter Roeck <linux@...ck-us.net>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: allow writes to /dev/urandom to influence fast
init
On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 10:00:49PM -0600, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>
> Another variation on that would be to do what this current patch does,
> but only crng_pre_init_inject() on CAP_SYS_ADMIN. But this has the same
> pitfall of only working as intended at cnrg_init=0 but not crng_init=1.
> That's better than nothing, but it's not perfect, and it introduces that
> problem with RNDADDTOENTCNT.
Well, one could argue that "RNDADDTOENTCNT" is a problem that has
always been there, and it already requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. So I'm not
sure it makes it any worse.
> > > And perhaps we might consider attempting to deprecate RNDADDTOENTCNT at
> > > some point in the future.
> >
> > That would be a good idea. :-)
>
> Oh cool, I'm glad you agree. Let's do that then. Have a preferred path?
> Maybe just a pr_once() saying not to use it?
Probably. We could get more aggressive (e.g., WARN), but the first
Google search on RNDADDTOENTCNT returned:
https://github.com/jumpnow/rndaddtoentcnt
So I'm now regretting not silently making it vanish a decade or more ago...
- Ted
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