linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area

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Message-ID: <YjydSNnG6EJ1KWx0@zn.tnic>
Date:   Thu, 24 Mar 2022 17:33:12 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
To:     Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Andrew Scull <ascull@...gle.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
        Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@...hat.com>,
        Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@...hat.com>,
        Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Jim Cadden <jcadden@....com>,
        Daniele Buono <dbuono@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing
 secret area

On Mon, Feb 28, 2022 at 11:42:50AM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
> Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted
> Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs
> memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.  In SEV,
> secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the
> guest starts running.
> 
> OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its
> AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the
> Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were
> not available in the guest kernel.
> 
> The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for
> injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs
> using a new efi_secret kernel module.  The module is autoloaded (by the
> EFI driver) if the secret area is populated.

Right, so this thing.

Tom and I were talking about SEV* guest debugging today and I believe
there might be another use case for this: SEV-ES guests cannot find out
from an attestation report - like SNP guests can - whether they're being
debugged or not so it would be very helpful if the fact that a -ES guest
is being debugged, could be supplied through such a secrets blob.

Because then, when I'm singlestepping the guest with gdb over the
gdbstub, the guest could determine based on those guest-owner previously
injected secrets whether it should allow debugging or not.

And this is where your set comes in.

However, I'm wondering if - instead of defining your own secrets structs
etc - you could use the SNP confidential computing blob machinery the
SNP set is adding. In particular:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220307213356.2797205-30-brijesh.singh@amd.com/

And you're adding another GUID but maybe you could simply use the SNP
thing called EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID and mimick that layout.

That should unify things more. And then guest kernel code could query
the blob also for debugging policy and so on.

Thoughts, opinions?

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg