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Message-ID: <YkI2Lyv9SJaGPDz+@google.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 22:26:55 +0000
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, qemu-devel@...gnu.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
"Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
luto@...nel.org, jun.nakajima@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
ak@...ux.intel.com, david@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 06/13] KVM: Use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext
On Thu, Mar 10, 2022, Chao Peng wrote:
> @@ -4476,14 +4477,23 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
> break;
> }
> case KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION: {
> - struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem;
> + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext region_ext;
It's probably a good idea to zero initialize the full region to avoid consuming
garbage stack data if there's a bug and an _ext field is accessed without first
checking KVM_MEM_PRIVATE. I'm usually opposed to unnecessary initialization, but
this seems like something we could screw up quite easily.
> r = -EFAULT;
> - if (copy_from_user(&kvm_userspace_mem, argp,
> - sizeof(kvm_userspace_mem)))
> + if (copy_from_user(®ion_ext, argp,
> + sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region)))
> goto out;
> + if (region_ext.region.flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE) {
> + int offset = offsetof(
> + struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext,
> + private_offset);
> + if (copy_from_user(®ion_ext.private_offset,
> + argp + offset,
> + sizeof(region_ext) - offset))
In this patch, KVM_MEM_PRIVATE should result in an -EINVAL as it's not yet
supported. Copying the _ext on KVM_MEM_PRIVATE belongs in the "Expose KVM_MEM_PRIVATE"
patch.
Mechnically, what about first reading flags via get_user(), and then doing a single
copy_from_user()? It's technically more work in the common case, and requires an
extra check to guard against TOCTOU attacks, but this isn't a fast path by any means
and IMO the end result makes it easier to understand the relationship between
KVM_MEM_PRIVATE and the two different structs.
E.g.
case KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION: {
struct kvm_user_mem_region region;
unsigned long size;
u32 flags;
memset(®ion, 0, sizeof(region));
r = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(flags, (u32 __user *)(argp + offsetof(typeof(region), flags))))
goto out;
if (flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE)
size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext);
else
size = sizeof(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region);
if (copy_from_user(®ion, argp, size))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if ((flags ^ region.flags) & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, ®ion);
break;
}
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> - r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &kvm_userspace_mem);
> + r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, ®ion_ext);
> break;
> }
> case KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG: {
> --
> 2.17.1
>
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