linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 4/4] module, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verification

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Date:   Mon, 28 Mar 2022 14:44:30 +0000
From:   Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
To:     joeyli <jlee@...e.com>
CC:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Philipp Rudo <prudo@...hat.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
        Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>,
        James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
        Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
        Kairui Song <kasong@...hat.com>,
        Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-s390@...r.kernel.org" <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-modules@...r.kernel.org" <linux-modules@...r.kernel.org>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "stable@...nel.org" <stable@...nel.org>,
        Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@...e.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] module, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for
 signature verification



> On Mar 28, 2022, at 4:15 AM, joeyli <jlee@...e.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Mimi,
> 
> Sorry for bother you for this old topic.
> 
> On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 09:47:30PM +0100, Michal Suchánek wrote:
>> Hello,
>> 
>> On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 03:08:18PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>> [Cc'ing Eric Snowberg]
>>> 
>>> Hi Michal,
>>> 
>>> On Tue, 2022-02-15 at 20:39 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
>>>> Commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify")
>>>> adds support for use of platform keyring in kexec verification but
>>>> support for modules is missing.
>>>> 
>>>> Add support for verification of modules with keys from platform keyring
>>>> as well.
>>> 
>>> Permission for loading the pre-OS keys onto the "platform" keyring and
>>> using them is limited to verifying the kexec kernel image, nothing
>>> else.
>> 
>> Why is the platform keyring limited to kexec, and nothing else?
>> 
>> It should either be used for everything or for nothing. You have the
>> option to compile it in and then it should be used, and the option to
>> not compile it in and then it cannot be used.
>> 
>> There are two basic use cases:
>> 
>> (1) there is a vendor key which is very hard to use so you sign
>> something small and simple like shim with the vendor key, and sign your
>> kernel and modules with your own key that's typically enrolled with shim
>> MOK, and built into the kernel.
>> 
>> (2) you import your key into the firmware, and possibly disable the
>> vendor key. You can load the kernel directly without shim, and then your
>> signing key is typically in the platform keyring and built into the
>> kernel.
>> 
> 
> In the second use case, if user can enroll their own key to db either before
> or after hardware shipping. And they don't need shim because they removed
> Microsoft or OEM/ODM keys.  Why kernel can not provide a Kconfig option to
> them for trusting db keys for verifying kernel module, or for IMA (using CA
> in db)?
> 
> In the above use case for distro, partner doesn't need to re-compiler distro
> kernel. They just need to re-sign distro kernel and modules. Which means
> that the partner trusted distro. Then the partner's key in db can be used to
> verify kernel image and also kernel module without shim involve.

If shim is used, the new machine keyring can be used to solve this problem. 
This pull request [1] allows additional certificates to be loaded into the MOKList 
without going through MokManager.  Have the end-user/partner create a 
shim_certificate.efi containing their key. Then sign it with their DB key.  When 
shim boots, it will validate shim_certificate.efi against the DB key and load the 
key contained within it into the MOKList.  Now both module and kernel validation 
can be performed with this key, since it is contained within the machine keyring.

[1] https://github.com/rhboot/shim/pull/446