linux-kernel - Re: kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:747:16: sparse: sparse: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces):

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20220328111503.1629c464@gandalf.local.home>
Date:   Mon, 28 Mar 2022 11:15:03 -0400
From:   Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To:     kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>
Cc:     Beau Belgrave <beaub@...ux.microsoft.com>, kbuild-all@...ts.01.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:747:16: sparse: sparse:
 incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces):

On Mon, 28 Mar 2022 15:39:22 +0800
kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com> wrote:

> sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
> >> kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:747:16: sparse: sparse: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces):
> >> kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:747:16: sparse:    void [noderef] __rcu *
> >> kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:747:16: sparse:    void *
> >> kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:811:13: sparse: sparse: cast removes address space '__user' of expression
> >> kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:811:13: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@     expected void [noderef] __user *buf @@     got char * @@  
>    kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:811:13: sparse:     expected void [noderef] __user *buf
>    kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:811:13: sparse:     got char *
>    kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:827:16: sparse: sparse: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces):
>    kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:827:16: sparse:    void [noderef] __rcu *
>    kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:827:16: sparse:    void *
>    kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:854:9: sparse: sparse: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces):
>    kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:854:9: sparse:    void [noderef] __rcu *
>    kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c:854:9: sparse:    void *
> 
> vim +747 kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
> 
>    730	
>    731	/*
>    732	 * Validates the user payload and writes via iterator.
>    733	 */
>    734	static ssize_t user_events_write_core(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *i)
>    735	{
>    736		struct user_event_refs *refs;

Looks like the above needs to be:

			struct user_event_refs __rcu *refs;

>    737		struct user_event *user = NULL;
>    738		struct tracepoint *tp;
>    739		ssize_t ret = i->count;
>    740		int idx;
>    741	
>    742		if (unlikely(copy_from_iter(&idx, sizeof(idx), i) != sizeof(idx)))
>    743			return -EFAULT;
>    744	
>    745		rcu_read_lock_sched();
>    746	
>  > 747		refs = rcu_dereference_sched(file->private_data);  
>    748	
>    749		/*
>    750		 * The refs->events array is protected by RCU, and new items may be
>    751		 * added. But the user retrieved from indexing into the events array
>    752		 * shall be immutable while the file is opened.
>    753		 */
>    754		if (likely(refs && idx < refs->count))
>    755			user = refs->events[idx];
>    756	
>    757		rcu_read_unlock_sched();
>    758	
>    759		if (unlikely(user == NULL))
>    760			return -ENOENT;
>    761	
>    762		tp = &user->tracepoint;
>    763	
>    764		/*
>    765		 * It's possible key.enabled disables after this check, however
>    766		 * we don't mind if a few events are included in this condition.
>    767		 */
>    768		if (likely(atomic_read(&tp->key.enabled) > 0)) {
>    769			struct tracepoint_func *probe_func_ptr;
>    770			user_event_func_t probe_func;
>    771			void *tpdata;
>    772			void *kdata;
>    773			u32 datalen;
>    774	
>    775			kdata = kmalloc(i->count, GFP_KERNEL);
>    776	
>    777			if (unlikely(!kdata))
>    778				return -ENOMEM;
>    779	
>    780			datalen = copy_from_iter(kdata, i->count, i);
>    781	
>    782			rcu_read_lock_sched();
>    783	
>    784			probe_func_ptr = rcu_dereference_sched(tp->funcs);
>    785	
>    786			if (probe_func_ptr) {
>    787				do {
>    788					probe_func = probe_func_ptr->func;
>    789					tpdata = probe_func_ptr->data;
>    790					probe_func(user, kdata, datalen, tpdata);
>    791				} while ((++probe_func_ptr)->func);
>    792			}
>    793	
>    794			rcu_read_unlock_sched();
>    795	
>    796			kfree(kdata);
>    797		}
>    798	
>    799		return ret;
>    800	}
>    801	
>    802	static ssize_t user_events_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf,
>    803					 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
>    804	{
>    805		struct iovec iov;
>    806		struct iov_iter i;
>    807	
>    808		if (unlikely(*ppos != 0))
>    809			return -EFAULT;
>    810	
>  > 811		if (unlikely(import_single_range(READ, (char *)ubuf, count, &iov, &i)))  

						(char __user *)ubuf

-- Steve

>    812			return -EFAULT;
>    813	
>    814		return user_events_write_core(file, &i);
>    815	}
>    816	
>