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Message-ID: <f6cf4112-b7b9-7ad7-dbb0-27304176146f@digikod.net>
Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 18:06:15 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@...labora.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Philippe Trébuchet
<philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@...uxfoundation.org>,
Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,
Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>,
Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)
Hi,
What is the status of this pull request? Do you need something more?
Regards,
Mickaël
On 21/03/2022 17:15, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Hi Linus,
>
> This patch series adds a new syscall named trusted_for. It enables user
> space to ask the kernel: is this file descriptor's content trusted to be
> used for this purpose? The set of usage currently only contains
> execution, but other may follow (e.g. configuration, sensitive data).
> If the kernel identifies the file descriptor as trustworthy for this
> usage, user space should then take this information into account. The
> "execution" usage means that the content of the file descriptor is
> trusted according to the system policy to be executed by user space,
> which means that it interprets the content or (try to) maps it as
> executable memory.
>
> A simple system-wide security policy can be set by the system
> administrator through a sysctl configuration consistent with the mount
> points or the file access rights. The documentation explains the
> prerequisites.
>
> It is important to note that this can only enable to extend access
> control managed by the kernel. Hence it enables current access control
> mechanism to be extended and become a superset of what they can
> currently control. Indeed, the security policy could also be delegated
> to an LSM, either a MAC system or an integrity system. For instance,
> this is required to close a major IMA measurement/appraisal interpreter
> integrity gap by bringing the ability to check the use of scripts.
> Other uses are expected as well.
>
> For further details, please see the latest cover letter:
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220104155024.48023-1-mic@digikod.net
>
> Commit dae71698b6c5 ("printk: Move back proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin()
> to sysctl.c") was recently added due to the sysctl refactoring.
>
> Commit e674341a90b9 ("selftests/interpreter: fix separate directory
> build") will fix some test build cases as explained here:
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220119101531.2850400-1-usama.anjum@collabora.com
> Merging this commit without the new KHDR_INCLUDES is not an issue.
> The upcoming kselftest pull request is ready:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest.git/log/?h=next
>
> This patch series has been open for review for more than three years and
> got a lot of feedbacks (and bikeshedding) which were all considered.
> Since I heard no objection, please consider to pull this code for
> v5.18-rc1 . These five patches have been successfully tested in the
> latest linux-next releases for several weeks.
>
> Regards,
> Mickaël
>
> --
> The following changes since commit dcb85f85fa6f142aae1fe86f399d4503d49f2b60:
>
> gcc-plugins/stackleak: Use noinstr in favor of notrace (2022-02-03 17:02:21 -0800)
>
> are available in the Git repository at:
>
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux.git tags/trusted-for-v18
>
> for you to fetch changes up to e674341a90b95c3458d684ae25e6891afc3e03ad:
>
> selftests/interpreter: fix separate directory build (2022-03-04 10:56:25 +0100)
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Add the trusted_for system call (v18)
>
> The final goal of this patch series is to enable the kernel to be a
> global policy manager by entrusting processes with access control at
> their level. To reach this goal, two complementary parts are required:
> * user space needs to be able to know if it can trust some file
> descriptor content for a specific usage;
> * and the kernel needs to make available some part of the policy
> configured by the system administrator.
>
> In a nutshell, this is a required building block to control script
> execution.
>
> For further details see the latest cover letter:
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220104155024.48023-1-mic@digikod.net
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Mickaël Salaün (4):
> printk: Move back proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin() to sysctl.c
> fs: Add trusted_for(2) syscall implementation and related sysctl
> arch: Wire up trusted_for(2)
> selftest/interpreter: Add tests for trusted_for(2) policies
>
> Muhammad Usama Anjum (1):
> selftests/interpreter: fix separate directory build
>
> Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst | 50 +++
> arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 +
> arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 +
> arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 +
> arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
> arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
> arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
> fs/open.c | 133 ++++++++
> fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 +
> include/linux/sysctl.h | 3 +
> include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +-
> include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h | 18 +
> kernel/printk/sysctl.c | 9 -
> kernel/sysctl.c | 9 +
> tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
> tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/.gitignore | 2 +
> tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/Makefile | 21 ++
> tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/config | 1 +
> .../selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c | 362 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 32 files changed, 625 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/trusted-for.h
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/.gitignore
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/Makefile
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/config
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/interpreter/trust_policy_test.c
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