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Date:   Wed, 30 Mar 2022 12:59:33 +0800
From:   Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
To:     "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
        "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@...el.com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
        Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.com>
Cc:     baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com, Eric Auger <eric.auger@...hat.com>,
        "Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu@...el.com>,
        "Pan, Jacob jun" <jacob.jun.pan@...el.com>,
        "iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 02/11] iommu: Add iommu_group_singleton_lockdown()

Hi Kevin,

On 2022/3/29 16:42, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>> From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2022 1:38 PM
>>
>> Some of the interfaces in the IOMMU core require that only a single
>> kernel device driver controls the device in the IOMMU group. The
>> existing method is to check the device count in the IOMMU group in
>> the interfaces. This is unreliable because any device added to the
>> IOMMU group later breaks this assumption without notifying the driver
>> using the interface. This adds iommu_group_singleton_lockdown() that
>> checks the requirement and locks down the IOMMU group with only single
>> device driver bound.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
>> ---
>>   drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
>>   1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
>> index 0c42ece25854..9fb8a5b4491e 100644
>> --- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
>> +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
>> @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct iommu_group {
>>   	struct list_head entry;
>>   	unsigned int owner_cnt;
>>   	void *owner;
>> +	bool singleton_lockdown;
>>   };
>>
>>   struct group_device {
>> @@ -968,15 +969,16 @@ void iommu_group_remove_device(struct device
>> *dev)
>>   }
>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iommu_group_remove_device);
>>
>> -static int iommu_group_device_count(struct iommu_group *group)
>> +/* Callers should hold the group->mutex. */
>> +static bool iommu_group_singleton_lockdown(struct iommu_group *group)
>>   {
>> -	struct group_device *entry;
>> -	int ret = 0;
>> -
>> -	list_for_each_entry(entry, &group->devices, list)
>> -		ret++;
>> +	if (group->owner_cnt != 1 ||
>> +	    group->domain != group->default_domain ||
>> +	    group->owner)
>> +		return false;
> 
> Curious why there will be a case where group uses default_domain
> while still having a owner? I have the impression that owner is used
> for userspace DMA where a different domain is used.

You are right. The default domain is automatically detached when a user
is claimed. As long as a user is claimed, the group could only use an
empty or user-specified domain.

> 
>> +	group->singleton_lockdown = true;
>>
>> -	return ret;
>> +	return true;
>>   }
> 
> btw I'm not sure whether this is what SVA requires. IIRC the problem with
> SVA is because PASID TLP prefix is not counted in PCI packet routing thus
> a DMA target address with PASID might be treated as P2P if the address
> falls into the MMIO BAR of other devices in the group. This is why the
> original code needs to strictly apply SVA in a group containing a single
> device, instead of a group attached by a single driver, unless we want to
> reserve those MMIO ranges in CPU VA space.

You are right. But I don't think the IOMMU core is able to guarantee
above in a platform/device-agnostic way. Or any suggestions?

I guess this should be somewhat off-loaded to the device driver which
knows details of the device. The device driver should know this and
guarantee it before calling
iommu_dev_enable_feature(dev, IOMMU_DEV_FEAT_SVA).

This patch itself just replaces the existing
"iommu_group_device_count(group) != 1" logic with a new one based on the
group ownership logistics. The former is obviously not friendly to
device hot joined afterward.

> 
> Jean can correct me if my memory is wrong.
> 
> Thanks
> Kevin

Best regards,
baolu

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