linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 00/13] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <Ykcy7fj/d+f9OUl/@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 1 Apr 2022 17:14:21 +0000
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
        Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
        kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, qemu-devel@...gnu.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        "J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
        "Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/13] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM
 guest private memory

On Fri, Apr 01, 2022, Quentin Perret wrote:
> The typical flow is as follows:
> 
>  - the host asks the hypervisor to run a guest;
> 
>  - the hypervisor does the context switch, which includes switching
>    stage-2 page-tables;
> 
>  - initially the guest has an empty stage-2 (we don't require
>    pre-faulting everything), which means it'll immediately fault;
> 
>  - the hypervisor switches back to host context to handle the guest
>    fault;
> 
>  - the host handler finds the corresponding memslot and does the
>    ipa->hva conversion. In our current implementation it uses a longterm
>    GUP pin on the corresponding page;
> 
>  - once it has a page, the host handler issues a hypercall to donate the
>    page to the guest;
> 
>  - the hypervisor does a bunch of checks to make sure the host owns the
>    page, and if all is fine it will unmap it from the host stage-2 and
>    map it in the guest stage-2, and do some bookkeeping as it needs to
>    track page ownership, etc;
> 
>  - the guest can then proceed to run, and possibly faults in many more
>    pages;
> 
>  - when it wants to, the guest can then issue a hypercall to share a
>    page back with the host;
> 
>  - the hypervisor checks the request, maps the page back in the host
>    stage-2, does more bookkeeping and returns back to the host to notify
>    it of the share;
> 
>  - the host kernel at that point can exit back to userspace to relay
>    that information to the VMM;
> 
>  - rinse and repeat.

I assume there is a scenario where a page can be converted from shared=>private?
If so, is there a use case where that happens post-boot _and_ the contents of the
page are preserved?

> We currently don't allow the host punching holes in the guest IPA space.

The hole doesn't get punched in guest IPA space, it gets punched in the private
backing store, which is host PA space.

> Once it has donated a page to a guest, it can't have it back until the
> guest has been entirely torn down (at which point all of memory is
> poisoned by the hypervisor obviously).

The guest doesn't have to know that it was handed back a different page.  It will
require defining the semantics to state that the trusted hypervisor will clear
that page on conversion, but IMO the trusted hypervisor should be doing that
anyways.  IMO, forcing on the guest to correctly zero pages on conversion is
unnecessarily risky because converting private=>shared and preserving the contents
should be a very, very rare scenario, i.e. it's just one more thing for the guest
to get wrong.

If there is a use case where the page contents need to be preserved, then that can
and should be an explicit request from the guest, and can be handled through
export/import style functions.  Export/import would be slow-ish due to memcpy(),
which is why I asked if there's a need to do this specific action frequently (or
at all).