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Message-ID: <2777189.mvXUDI8C0e@x2>
Date: Fri, 01 Apr 2022 09:39:38 -0400
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, linux-audit@...hat.com,
CGEL <cgel.zte@...il.com>
Cc: kbuild-all@...ts.01.org, Zeal Robot <zealci@....com.cn>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, eparis@...hat.com,
dai.shixin@....com.cn, Yang Yang <yang.yang29@....com.cn>,
linux-audit@...hat.com, ink@...assic.park.msu.ru,
huang.junhua@....com.cn, guo.xiaofeng@....com.cn,
mattst88@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] audit: do a quick exit when syscall number is invalid
On Thursday, March 31, 2022 9:57:05 PM EDT CGEL wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 31, 2022 at 10:16:23AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 10:29 PM CGEL <cgel.zte@...il.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 10:48:12AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > If audit is not generating SYSCALL records, even for invalid/ENOSYS
> > > > syscalls, I would consider that a bug which should be fixed.
> > >
> > > If we fix this bug, do you think audit invalid/ENOSYS syscalls better
> > > be forcible or be a rule that can be configure? I think configure is
> > > better.
> >
> > It isn't clear to me exactly what you are asking, but I would expect
> > the existing audit syscall filtering mechanism to work regardless if
> > the syscall is valid or not.
>
> Thanks, I try to make it more clear. We found that auditctl would only
> set rule with syscall number (>=0 && <2047). So if userspace using
> syscall whose number is (<0 || >=2047), there seems no meaning for
> kernel audit to handle it, since this kind of syscall will never hit
> any audit rule(this rule could not be set by auditctl).
This limit is imposed by:
/usr/include/linux/audit.h
struct audit_rule_data {
...
__u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; /* syscall(s) affected */
Where #define AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE 64
So, 64 * 32 = 2048
-Steve
> By the way it's a little strange for auditctl(using libaudit.c) to limit
> syscall number (>=0 && <2047)(see audit_rule_syscall_data()), especially
> we know NR_syscalls is the real limit in kernel, you can see how other
> kernel code to the similar thing in ftrace_syscall_enter():
>
> static void ftrace_syscall_enter(void *data, struct pt_regs
> *regs, long id)
> {
> ...
> syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs);
> if (syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= NR_syscalls)
> return;
> ...
> }
>
> Thanks.
>
> > Beware that there are some limitations
> > to the audit syscall filter, which are unfortunately baked into the
> > current design/implementation, which may affect this to some extent.
>
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> Linux-audit@...hat.com
> https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
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