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Message-ID: <54df6da8-ad68-cc75-48db-d18fc87430e9@intel.com>
Date:   Sun, 3 Apr 2022 22:38:50 +0800
From:   Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@...el.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Kan Liang <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Hu, Robert" <robert.hu@...el.com>,
        "Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 8/8] KVM: VMX: enable IPI virtualization


On 4/1/2022 10:37 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 04, 2022, Zeng Guang wrote:
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h
>> index ff20776dc83b..7ce616af2db2 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h
>> @@ -86,4 +86,6 @@
>>   #define VMX_FEATURE_ENCLV_EXITING	( 2*32+ 28) /* "" VM-Exit on ENCLV (leaf dependent) */
>>   #define VMX_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION	( 2*32+ 30) /* "" VM-Exit when bus lock caused */
>>   
>> +/* Tertiary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls, word 3 */
>> +#define VMX_FEATURE_IPI_VIRT		(3*32 +  4) /* "" Enable IPI virtualization */
> Please follow the existing (weird) spacing and style.  And this should definitely
> be enumerated to userspace, it's one of the more interesting VMX features, i.e. drop
> the "".
>
> #define VMX_FEATURE_IPI_VIRT		( 3*32+  4) /* Enable IPI virtualization */


Now understand the meaning of comment without string "". :)

>>   #endif /* _ASM_X86_VMXFEATURES_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
>> index 31f3d88b3e4d..5f656c9e33be 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
>> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept;
>>   extern bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest;
>>   extern bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits;
>>   extern bool __read_mostly enable_pml;
>> +extern bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv;
>>   extern int __read_mostly pt_mode;
>>   
>>   #define PT_MODE_SYSTEM		0
>> @@ -283,6 +284,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_apicv(void)
>>   		cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr();
>>   }
>>   
>> +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ipiv(void)
>> +{
>> +	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl & TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT;
>> +}
>> +
>>   static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority(void)
>>   {
>>   	return cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow() &&
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
>> index aa1fe9085d77..0882115a9b7a 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c
>> @@ -177,11 +177,24 @@ static void pi_enable_wakeup_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>   	local_irq_restore(flags);
>>   }
>>   
>> +static bool vmx_can_use_pi_wakeup(struct kvm *kvm)
>> +{
>> +	/*
>> +	 * If a blocked vCPU can be the target of posted interrupts,
>> +	 * switching notification vector is needed so that kernel can
>> +	 * be informed when an interrupt is posted and get the chance
>> +	 * to wake up the blocked vCPU. For now, using posted interrupt
>> +	 * for vCPU wakeup when IPI virtualization or VT-d PI can be
>> +	 * enabled.
>> +	 */
>> +	return vmx_can_use_ipiv(kvm) || vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(kvm);
>> +}
>> +
>>   void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>   {
>>   	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
>>   
>> -	if (!vmx_can_use_vtd_pi(vcpu->kvm))
>> +	if (!vmx_can_use_pi_wakeup(vcpu->kvm))
>>   		return;
>>   
>>   	if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu) && !vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> index 7beba7a9f247..121d4f0b35b9 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> @@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ module_param(fasteoi, bool, S_IRUGO);
>>   
>>   module_param(enable_apicv, bool, S_IRUGO);
>>   
>> +bool __read_mostly enable_ipiv = true;
>> +module_param(enable_ipiv, bool, 0444);
>> +
>>   /*
>>    * If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use
>>    * VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not
>> @@ -227,6 +230,8 @@ static const struct {
>>   };
>>   
>>   #define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
>> +#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1
> Put this in posted_intr.h to give the "PID" part some context.
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
> index 9a45d5c9f116..26992076552e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h
> @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
>   #define POSTED_INTR_ON  0
>   #define POSTED_INTR_SN  1
>
> +#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1
> +
>   /* Posted-Interrupt Descriptor */
>   struct pi_desc {
>          u32 pir[8];     /* Posted interrupt requested */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index bbdd77a0388f..6a757e31d1d1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -230,7 +230,6 @@ static const struct {
>   };
>
>   #define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
> -#define PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID 1
>
>   static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;


OK.


>> +
>>   static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
>>   
>>   static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
>> @@ -2543,7 +2548,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
>>   	}
>>   
>>   	if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS) {
>> -		u64 opt3 = 0;
>> +		u64 opt3 = TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT;
>>   		u64 min3 = 0;
>>   
>>   		if (adjust_vmx_controls_64(min3, opt3,
>> @@ -3898,6 +3903,8 @@ static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>   		vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_RW);
>>   		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W);
>>   		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W);
>> +		if (enable_ipiv)
>> +			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR),MSR_TYPE_RW);
> Missing space after the last comma.
>
>>   	}
>>   }
>>   
>> @@ -4219,14 +4226,21 @@ static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>   
>>   	pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
>>   	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
>> -		if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
>> +		if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) {
>>   			secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx,
>>   				      SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
>>   				      SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
>> -		else
>> +			if (enable_ipiv)
>> +				tertiary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx,
>> +						TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT);
>> +		} else {
>>   			secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx,
>>   					SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
>>   					SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
>> +			if (enable_ipiv)
>> +				tertiary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx,
>> +						TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT);
> Oof.  The existing code is kludgy.  We should never reach this point without
> enable_apicv=true, and enable_apicv should be forced off if APICv isn't supported,
> let alone seconary exec being support.
>
> Unless I'm missing something, throw a prep patch earlier in the series to drop
> the cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() check, that will clean this code up a smidge.

cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() check can avoid wrong vmcs write in case mistaken
invocation.

>> +		}
>>   	}
>>   
>>   	vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(vcpu);
>> @@ -4260,7 +4274,16 @@ static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>   
>>   static u64 vmx_tertiary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>   {
>> -	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl;
>> +	u64 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_3rd_exec_ctrl;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * IPI virtualization relies on APICv. Disable IPI
>> +	 * virtualization if APICv is inhibited.
> Wrap comments at 80 chars.
>
>> +	 */
>> +	if (!enable_ipiv || !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
>> +		exec_control &= ~TERTIARY_EXEC_IPI_VIRT;
>> +
>> +	return exec_control;
>>   }
>>   
>>   /*
>> @@ -4408,6 +4431,29 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>   	return exec_control;
>>   }
>>   
>> +static int vmx_alloc_pid_table(struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx)
>> +{
>> +	struct page *pages;
>> +
>> +	if(kvm_vmx->pid_table)
> Needs a space after the "if".  Moot point though, this shouldn't exist.
>
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,
>> +			get_order(kvm_vmx->kvm.arch.max_vcpu_id * sizeof(u64)));
> Instead of sizeof(u64), do sizeof(*kvm_vmx->pid_table), that way the code is more
> self documenting and less fragile.  The PID table size obviously shouldn't change
> since it architecturally, but it's a good habit/style.


Good point, I'll follow up. Thanks.


>> +
>> +	if (!pages)
>> +		return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> +	kvm_vmx->pid_table = (void *)page_address(pages);
>> +	kvm_vmx->pid_last_index = kvm_vmx->kvm.arch.max_vcpu_id - 1;
> No need to cache pid_last_index, it's only used in one place (initializing the
> VMCS field).  The allocation/free paths can use max_vcpu_id directly.  Actually,

In previous design, we don't forbid to change max_vcpu_id after vCPU 
creation or for other
purpose in future. Thus it's safe to decouple them and make ipiv usage 
independent. If it can
be sure that max_vcpu_id won't be modified , we can totally remove 
pid_last_index and use
max_vcpu_id directly even for initializing the VMCD field.

> for the alloc/free, add a helper to provide the order, that'll clean up both
> call sites and avoid duplicate math.  E.g.
>
> int vmx_get_pid_table_order(struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx)
> {
> 	return get_order(kvm_vmx->kvm.arch.max_vcpu_ids * sizeof(*kvm_vmx->pid_table));
> }
>
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +bool vmx_can_use_ipiv(struct kvm *kvm)
>> +{
>> +	return irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) && enable_ipiv;
>> +}
> Move this helper to posted_intr.h (or maybe vmx.h, though I think posted_intr.h
> is a slightly better fit) and make it static inline.  This patch already exposes
> enable_ipiv, and the usage in vmx_can_use_pi_wakeup() will be frequent enough
> that making it inline is worthwhile.


I'll adapt and put it in vmx.h.


>> +
>>   #define VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP 0
>>   
>>   static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>> @@ -4443,6 +4489,13 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>   		vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->pi_desc)));
>>   	}
>>   
>> +	if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vmx->vcpu.kvm)) {
>> +		struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vmx->vcpu.kvm);
> Hoist this to the top of the function, that way we don't end up with variable
> shadowing and don't have to move it if future code also needs to access kvm_vmx.
OK.
>> +
>> +		vmcs_write64(PID_POINTER_TABLE, __pa(kvm_vmx->pid_table));
>> +		vmcs_write16(LAST_PID_POINTER_INDEX, kvm_vmx->pid_last_index);
>> +	}
>> +
>>   	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm)) {
>>   		vmcs_write32(PLE_GAP, ple_gap);
>>   		vmx->ple_window = ple_window;
>> @@ -7123,6 +7176,22 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>   			goto free_vmcs;
>>   	}
>>   
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Allocate PID-table and program this vCPU's PID-table
>> +	 * entry if IPI virtualization can be enabled.
> Please wrap comments at 80 chars.  But I'd just drop this one entirely, the code
> is self-explanatory once the allocation and setting of the vCPU's entry are split.
>
>> +	 */
>> +	if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu->kvm)) {
>> +		struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm);
>> +
>> +		mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
>> +		err = vmx_alloc_pid_table(kvm_vmx);
>> +		mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
> This belongs in vmx_vm_init(), doing it in vCPU creation is a remnant of the
> dynamic resize approach that's no longer needed.
>
>   


We cannot allocate pid table in vmx_vm_init() as userspace has no chance 
to set
max_vcpu_ids at this stage. That's the reason we do it in vCPU creation 
instead.

>> +		if (err)
>> +			goto free_vmcs;
>> +		WRITE_ONCE(kvm_vmx->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id],
>> +			__pa(&vmx->pi_desc) | PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID);
> This gets to stay though.  Please align the indentation, i.e.
>
>
> 	if (vmx_can_use_ipiv(vcpu->kvm))
> 		WRITE_ONCE(to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm)->pid_table[vcpu->vcpu_id],
> 			   __pa(&vmx->pi_desc) | PID_TABLE_ENTRY_VALID);
OK.
>> +	}
>> +
>> / 	return 0;
>>   
>>   free_vmcs:
>> @@ -7756,6 +7825,15 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)
>>   	return supported & BIT(bit);
>>   }
>>   
>> +static void vmx_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>> +{
>> +	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
>> +
>> +	if (kvm_vmx->pid_table)
>> +		free_pages((unsigned long)kvm_vmx->pid_table,
>> +			get_order((kvm_vmx->pid_last_index + 1) * sizeof(u64)));
>> +}
>> +
>>   static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
>>   	.name = "kvm_intel",
>>   
>> @@ -7768,6 +7846,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
>>   
>>   	.vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
>>   	.vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
>> +	.vm_destroy = vmx_vm_destroy,
>>   
>>   	.vcpu_create = vmx_create_vcpu,
>>   	.vcpu_free = vmx_free_vcpu,
>> @@ -8022,6 +8101,9 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
>>   	if (!enable_apicv)
>>   		vmx_x86_ops.sync_pir_to_irr = NULL;
>>   
>> +	if (!enable_apicv || !cpu_has_vmx_ipiv())
>> +		enable_ipiv = false;
>> +
>>   	if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling()) {
>>   		kvm_has_tsc_control = true;
>>   		kvm_max_tsc_scaling_ratio = KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX;
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
>> index d4a647d3ed4a..5b65930a750e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
>> @@ -365,6 +365,9 @@ struct kvm_vmx {
>>   	unsigned int tss_addr;
>>   	bool ept_identity_pagetable_done;
>>   	gpa_t ept_identity_map_addr;
>> +	/* PID table for IPI virtualization */
> I like having a comment here since "pid_table" is ambiguous, but take the opportunity
> to explain PID, i.e.
>
> 	/* Posted Interrupt Descriptor (PID) table for IPI virtualization. */
OK.  Thanks to point it out.
>> +	u64 *pid_table;
>> +	u16 pid_last_index;
>>   };
>>   
>>   bool nested_vmx_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>> @@ -584,4 +587,6 @@ static inline int vmx_get_instr_info_reg2(u32 vmx_instr_info)
>>   	return (vmx_instr_info >> 28) & 0xf;
>>   }
>>   
>> +bool vmx_can_use_ipiv(struct kvm *kvm);
>> +
>>   #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_H */
>> -- 
>> 2.27.0
>>

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