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Message-Id: <20220405070437.826693540@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 09:29:41 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org,
Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@...il.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@...istor.com>,
linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.17 1034/1126] rxrpc: fix some null-ptr-deref bugs in server_key.c
From: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@...il.com>
commit ff8376ade4f668130385839cef586a0990f8ef87 upstream.
Some function calls are not implemented in rxrpc_no_security, there are
preparse_server_key, free_preparse_server_key and destroy_server_key.
When rxrpc security type is rxrpc_no_security, user can easily trigger a
null-ptr-deref bug via ioctl. So judgment should be added to prevent it
The crash log:
user@...kaller:~$ ./rxrpc_preparse_s
[ 37.956878][T15626] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 37.957645][T15626] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[ 37.958229][T15626] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[ 37.958762][T15626] PGD 4aadf067 P4D 4aadf067 PUD 4aade067 PMD 0
[ 37.959321][T15626] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 37.959739][T15626] CPU: 0 PID: 15626 Comm: rxrpc_preparse_ Not tainted 5.17.0-01442-gb47d5a4f6b8d #43
[ 37.960588][T15626] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 37.961474][T15626] RIP: 0010:0x0
[ 37.961787][T15626] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[ 37.962480][T15626] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d9abdc0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 37.963018][T15626] RAX: ffffffff84335200 RBX: ffff888012a1ce80 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 37.963727][T15626] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff84a736dc RDI: ffffc9000d9abe48
[ 37.964425][T15626] RBP: ffffc9000d9abe48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
[ 37.965118][T15626] R10: 000000000000000a R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffff888013145680
[ 37.965836][T15626] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffffffffffec R15: ffff8880432aba80
[ 37.966441][T15626] FS: 00007f2177907700(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 37.966979][T15626] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 37.967384][T15626] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000004aaf1000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 37.967864][T15626] Call Trace:
[ 37.968062][T15626] <TASK>
[ 37.968240][T15626] rxrpc_preparse_s+0x59/0x90
[ 37.968541][T15626] key_create_or_update+0x174/0x510
[ 37.968863][T15626] __x64_sys_add_key+0x139/0x1d0
[ 37.969165][T15626] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
[ 37.969451][T15626] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 37.969824][T15626] RIP: 0033:0x43a1f9
Signed-off-by: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@...il.com>
Tested-by: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@...istor.com>
cc: linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org
Link: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2022-March/005069.html
Fixes: 12da59fcab5a ("rxrpc: Hand server key parsing off to the security class")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164865013439.2941502.8966285221215590921.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
net/rxrpc/server_key.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/rxrpc/server_key.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/server_key.c
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_p
prep->payload.data[1] = (struct rxrpc_security *)sec;
+ if (!sec->preparse_server_key)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return sec->preparse_server_key(prep);
}
@@ -91,7 +94,7 @@ static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct
{
const struct rxrpc_security *sec = prep->payload.data[1];
- if (sec)
+ if (sec && sec->free_preparse_server_key)
sec->free_preparse_server_key(prep);
}
@@ -99,7 +102,7 @@ static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *
{
const struct rxrpc_security *sec = key->payload.data[1];
- if (sec)
+ if (sec && sec->destroy_server_key)
sec->destroy_server_key(key);
}
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