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Message-ID: <YkvoCQ/P1qUJgpmt@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2022 09:56:09 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, tglx@...utronix.de, bp@...en8.de,
luto@...nel.org, mingo@...hat.com, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, seanjc@...gle.com, kai.huang@...el.com,
cathy.zhang@...el.com, cedric.xing@...el.com,
haitao.huang@...el.com, mark.shanahan@...el.com, hpa@...or.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 05/30] x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page without
VMA permissions check
On Mon, Apr 04, 2022 at 09:49:13AM -0700, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> sgx_encl_load_page() is used to find and load an enclave page into
> enclave (EPC) memory, potentially loading it from the backing storage.
> Both usages of sgx_encl_load_page() are during an access to the
> enclave page from a VMA and thus the permissions of the VMA are
> considered before the enclave page is loaded.
>
> SGX2 functions operating on enclave pages belonging to an initialized
> enclave requiring the page to be in EPC. It is thus required to
> support loading enclave pages into the EPC independent from a VMA.
>
> Split the current sgx_encl_load_page() to support the two usages:
> A new call, sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(), behaves exactly like the
> current sgx_encl_load_page() that takes VMA permissions into account,
> while sgx_encl_load_page() just loads an enclave page into EPC.
>
> VMA, PTE, and EPCM permissions would continue to dictate whether
> the pages can be accessed from within an enclave.
>
> Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>
> ---
> Changes since V2:
> - New patch
>
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 2 ++
> 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> index 7c63a1911fae..05ae1168391c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
> @@ -131,25 +131,10 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
> return epc_page;
> }
>
> -static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> - unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long vm_flags)
> +static struct sgx_encl_page *__sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> + struct sgx_encl_page *entry)
> {
> - unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
> struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
> - struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
> -
> - entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
> - if (!entry)
> - return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> -
> - /*
> - * Verify that the faulted page has equal or higher build time
> - * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
> - * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
> - */
> - if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
> - return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
>
> /* Entry successfully located. */
> if (entry->epc_page) {
> @@ -175,6 +160,40 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> return entry;
> }
>
> +static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> + unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long vm_flags)
> +{
> + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
> + struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
> +
> + entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
> + if (!entry)
> + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> +
> + /*
> + * Verify that the page has equal or higher build time
> + * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
> + * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
> + */
> + if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
> + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> +
> + return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry);
> +}
> +
> +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> + unsigned long addr)
> +{
> + struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
> +
> + entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
> + if (!entry)
> + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> +
> + return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry);
> +}
> +
> static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> {
> unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
> @@ -196,7 +215,7 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
>
> mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
>
> - entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
> + entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
> if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
> mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
>
> @@ -344,7 +363,7 @@ static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> for ( ; ; ) {
> mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
>
> - entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr, vm_flags);
> + entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vm_flags);
> if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
> break;
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
> index fec43ca65065..6b34efba1602 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
> @@ -116,5 +116,7 @@ unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
> void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset);
> bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
> void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
> +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> + unsigned long addr);
>
> #endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
> --
> 2.25.1
>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
BR, Jarkko
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