linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs

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Message-ID: <385e4cf4-4cd1-8f41-5352-ea87a1f419ad@schaufler-ca.com>
Date:   Tue, 5 Apr 2022 07:49:49 -0700
From:   Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:     Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
        Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>
Cc:     Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        "corbet@....net" <corbet@....net>,
        "viro@...iv.linux.org.uk" <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        "ast@...nel.org" <ast@...nel.org>,
        "daniel@...earbox.net" <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        "andrii@...nel.org" <andrii@...nel.org>,
        "shuah@...nel.org" <shuah@...nel.org>,
        "mcoquelin.stm32@...il.com" <mcoquelin.stm32@...il.com>,
        "alexandre.torgue@...s.st.com" <alexandre.torgue@...s.st.com>,
        "zohar@...ux.ibm.com" <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        "bpf@...r.kernel.org" <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-stm32@...md-mailman.stormreply.com" 
        <linux-stm32@...md-mailman.stormreply.com>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF
 programs

On 4/4/2022 10:20 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>> From: Djalal Harouni [mailto:tixxdz@...il.com]
>> Sent: Monday, April 4, 2022 9:45 AM
>> On Sun, Apr 3, 2022 at 5:42 PM KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org> wrote:
>>> On Sat, Apr 2, 2022 at 1:55 AM Alexei Starovoitov
>>> <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> wrote:
>> ...
>>>>> Pinning
>>>>> them to unreachable inodes intuitively looked the
>>>>> way to go for achieving the stated goal.
>>>> We can consider inodes in bpffs that are not unlinkable by root
>>>> in the future, but certainly not for this use case.
>>> Can this not be already done by adding a BPF_LSM program to the
>>> inode_unlink LSM hook?
>>>
>> Also, beside of the inode_unlink... and out of curiosity: making sysfs/bpffs/
>> readonly after pinning, then using bpf LSM hooks
>> sb_mount|remount|unmount...
>> family combining bpf() LSM hook... isn't this enough to:
>> 1. Restrict who can pin to bpffs without using a full MAC
>> 2. Restrict who can delete or unmount bpf filesystem
>>
>> ?
> I'm thinking to implement something like this.
>
> First, I add a new program flag called
> BPF_F_STOP_ONCONFIRM, which causes the ref count
> of the link to increase twice at creation time. In this way,
> user space cannot make the link disappear, unless a
> confirmation is explicitly sent via the bpf() system call.
>
> Another advantage is that other LSMs can decide
> whether or not they allow a program with this flag
> (in the bpf security hook).
>
> This would work regardless of the method used to
> load the eBPF program (user space or kernel space).
>
> Second, I extend the bpf() system call with a new
> subcommand, BPF_LINK_CONFIRM_STOP, which
> decreasres the ref count for the link of the programs
> with the BPF_F_STOP_ONCONFIRM flag. I will also
> introduce a new security hook (something like
> security_link_confirm_stop), so that an LSM has the
> opportunity to deny the stop (the bpf security hook
> would not be sufficient to determine exactly for
> which link the confirmation is given, an LSM should
> be able to deny the stop for its own programs).

Would you please stop referring to a set of eBPF programs
loaded into the BPF LSM as an LSM? Call it a BPF security
module (BSM) if you must use an abbreviation. An LSM is a
provider of security_ hooks. In your case that is BPF. When
you call the set of eBPF programs an LSM it is like calling
an SELinux policy an LSM.

>
> What do you think?
>
> Thanks
>
> Roberto
>
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