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Message-ID: <91a02d50b2cba34dfb058fd864ba20ef1e6a5554.camel@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 05 Apr 2022 16:40:26 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, tglx@...utronix.de, bp@...en8.de,
luto@...nel.org, mingo@...hat.com, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org
Cc: seanjc@...gle.com, kai.huang@...el.com, cathy.zhang@...el.com,
cedric.xing@...el.com, haitao.huang@...el.com,
mark.shanahan@...el.com, hpa@...or.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, nathaniel@...fian.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 14/30] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page
permissions
On Tue, 2022-04-05 at 08:07 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, 2022-04-05 at 08:03 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Mon, 2022-04-04 at 09:49 -0700, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> > > In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be
> > > created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the
> > > time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example,
> > > pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be
> > > relocated need to always have RWX permissions.
> > >
> > > SGX2 includes a new function ENCLS[EMODPR] that is run from the kernel
> > > and can be used to restrict the EPCM permissions of regular enclave
> > > pages within an initialized enclave.
> > >
> > > Introduce ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS to support
> > > restricting EPCM permissions. With this ioctl() the user specifies
> > > a page range and the EPCM permissions to be applied to all pages in
> > > the provided range. ENCLS[EMODPR] is run to restrict the EPCM
> > > permissions followed by the ENCLS[ETRACK] flow that will ensure
> > > no cached linear-to-physical address mappings to the changed
> > > pages remain.
> > >
> > > It is possible for the permission change request to fail on any
> > > page within the provided range, either with an error encountered
> > > by the kernel or by the SGX hardware while running
> > > ENCLS[EMODPR]. To support partial success the ioctl() returns an
> > > error code based on failures encountered by the kernel as well
> > > as two result output parameters: one for the number of pages
> > > that were successfully changed and one for the SGX return code.
> > >
> > > The page table entry permissions are not impacted by the EPCM
> > > permission changes. VMAs and PTEs will continue to allow the
> > > maximum vetted permissions determined at the time the pages
> > > are added to the enclave. The SGX error code in a page fault
> > > will indicate if it was an EPCM permission check that prevented
> > > an access attempt.
> > >
> > > No checking is done to ensure that the permissions are actually
> > > being restricted. This is because the enclave may have relaxed
> > > the EPCM permissions from within the enclave without letting the
> > > kernel know. An attempt to relax permissions using this call will
> > > be ignored by the hardware.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>
> > > ---
> > > Changes since V2:
> > > - Include the sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready() utility
> > > that previously was in "x86/sgx: Support relaxing of enclave page
> > > permissions" that is removed from the next version.
> > > - Few renames requested by Jarkko:
> > > struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm ->
> > > struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions
> > > sgx_enclave_restrict_perm() ->
> > > sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions()
> > > sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm() ->
> > > sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions()
> > > - Make EPCM permissions independent from kernel view of
> > > permissions. (Jarkko)
> > > - Remove attempt at runtime tracking of EPCM permissions
> > > (sgx_encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits).
> > > - Do not flush page table entries - they are no longer impacted by
> > > EPCM permission changes.
> > > - Modify changelog to reflect new architecture.
> > > - Ensure at least PROT_READ is requested - enclave requires read
> > > access to the page for commands like EMODPE and EACCEPT. (Jarkko)
> > >
> > > Changes since V1:
> > > - Change terminology to use "relax" instead of "extend" to refer to
> > > the case when enclave page permissions are added (Dave).
> > > - Use ioctl() in commit message (Dave).
> > > - Add examples on what permissions would be allowed (Dave).
> > > - Split enclave page permission changes into two ioctl()s, one for
> > > permission restricting (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS)
> > > and one for permission relaxing (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RELAX_PERMISSIONS)
> > > (Jarkko).
> > > - In support of the ioctl() name change the following names have been
> > > changed:
> > > struct sgx_page_modp -> struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm
> > > sgx_ioc_page_modp() -> sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_perm()
> > > sgx_page_modp() -> sgx_enclave_restrict_perm()
> > > - ioctl() takes entire secinfo as input instead of
> > > page permissions only (Jarkko).
> > > - Fix kernel-doc to include () in function name.
> > > - Create and use utility for the ETRACK flow.
> > > - Fixups in comments
> > > - Move kernel-doc to function that provides documentation for
> > > Documentation/x86/sgx.rst.
> > > - Remove redundant comment.
> > > - Make explicit which members of struct sgx_enclave_restrict_perm
> > > are for output (Dave).
> > >
> > > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 21 +++
> > > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > 2 files changed, 263 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> > > index f4b81587e90b..a0a24e94fb27 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> > > @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ enum sgx_page_flags {
> > > _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x03, struct sgx_enclave_provision)
> > > #define SGX_IOC_VEPC_REMOVE_ALL \
> > > _IO(SGX_MAGIC, 0x04)
> > > +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS \
> > > + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x05, struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions)
> > >
> > > /**
> > > * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
> > > @@ -76,6 +78,25 @@ struct sgx_enclave_provision {
> > > __u64 fd;
> > > };
> > >
> > > +/**
> > > + * struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions - parameters for ioctl
> > > + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
> > > + * @offset: starting page offset (page aligned relative to enclave base
> > > + * address defined in SECS)
> > > + * @length: length of memory (multiple of the page size)
> > > + * @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data containing the new permission bits
> > > + * for pages in range described by @offset and @length
> > > + * @result: (output) SGX result code of ENCLS[EMODPR] function
> > > + * @count: (output) bytes successfully changed (multiple of page size)
> > > + */
> > > +struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions {
> > > + __u64 offset;
> > > + __u64 length;
> > > + __u64 secinfo;
> > > + __u64 result;
> > > + __u64 count;
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > struct sgx_enclave_run;
> > >
> > > /**
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> > > index 0460fd224a05..4d88bfd163e7 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> > > @@ -660,6 +660,244 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> > > return sgx_set_attribute(&encl->attributes_mask, params.fd);
> > > }
> > >
> > > +/*
> > > + * Ensure enclave is ready for SGX2 functions. Readiness is checked
> > > + * by ensuring the hardware supports SGX2 and the enclave is initialized
> > > + * and thus able to handle requests to modify pages within it.
> > > + */
> > > +static int sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(struct sgx_encl *encl)
> > > +{
> > > + if (!(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)))
> > > + return -ENODEV;
> > > +
> > > + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + return 0;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * Return valid permission fields from a secinfo structure provided by
> > > + * user space. The secinfo structure is required to only have bits in
> > > + * the permission fields set.
> > > + */
> > > +static int sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo(void __user *_secinfo, u64 *secinfo_perm)
> > > +{
> > > + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> > > + u64 perm;
> > > +
> > > + if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)_secinfo,
> > > + sizeof(secinfo)))
> > > + return -EFAULT;
> > > +
> > > + if (secinfo.flags & ~SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + if (memchr_inv(secinfo.reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo.reserved)))
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + perm = secinfo.flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
> > > +
> > > + /*
> > > + * Read access is required for the enclave to be able to use the page.
> > > + * SGX instructions like ENCLU[EMODPE] and ENCLU[EACCEPT] require
> > > + * read access.
> > > + */
> > > + if (!(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R))
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + *secinfo_perm = perm;
> > > +
> > > + return 0;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address
> > > + * mappings are present before they can succeed. Collaborate with
> > > + * hardware via ENCLS[ETRACK] to ensure that all cached
> > > + * linear-to-physical address mappings belonging to all threads of
> > > + * the enclave are cleared. See sgx_encl_cpumask() for details.
> > > + */
> > > +static int sgx_enclave_etrack(struct sgx_encl *encl)
> > > +{
> > > + void *epc_virt;
> > > + int ret;
> > > +
> > > + epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
> > > + ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
> > > + if (ret) {
> > > + /*
> > > + * ETRACK only fails when there is an OS issue. For
> > > + * example, two consecutive ETRACK was sent without
> > > + * completed IPI between.
> > > + */
> > > + pr_err_once("ETRACK returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
> > > + /*
> > > + * Send IPIs to kick CPUs out of the enclave and
> > > + * try ETRACK again.
> > > + */
> > > + on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
> > > + ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
> > > + if (ret) {
> > > + pr_err_once("ETRACK repeat returned %d (0x%x)",
> > > + ret, ret);
> > > + return -EFAULT;
> > > + }
> > > + }
> > > + on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
> > > +
> > > + return 0;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/**
> > > + * sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions() - Restrict EPCM permissions
> > > + * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong.
> > > + * @modp: Checked parameters from user on which pages need modifying.
> > > + * @secinfo_perm: New (validated) permission bits.
> > > + *
> > > + * Return:
> > > + * - 0: Success.
> > > + * - -errno: Otherwise.
> > > + */
> > > +static long
> > > +sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> > > + struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions *modp,
> > > + u64 secinfo_perm)
> > > +{
> > > + struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
> > > + struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
> > > + unsigned long addr;
> > > + unsigned long c;
> > > + void *epc_virt;
> > > + int ret;
> > > +
> > > + memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
> > > + secinfo.flags = secinfo_perm;
> > > +
> > > + for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> > > + addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
> > > +
> > > + mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
> > > +
> > > + entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
> > > + if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
> > > + ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT;
> > > + goto out_unlock;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /*
> > > + * Changing EPCM permissions is only supported on regular
> > > + * SGX pages. Attempting this change on other pages will
> > > + * result in #PF.
> > > + */
> > > + if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) {
> > > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > > + goto out_unlock;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /*
> > > + * Do not verify the permission bits requested. Kernel
> > > + * has no control over how EPCM permissions can be relaxed
> > > + * from within the enclave. ENCLS[EMODPR] can only
> > > + * remove existing EPCM permissions, attempting to set
> > > + * new permissions will be ignored by the hardware.
> > > + */
> > > +
> > > + /* Change EPCM permissions. */
> > > + epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page);
> > > + ret = __emodpr(&secinfo, epc_virt);
> > > + if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
> > > + /*
> > > + * All possible faults should be avoidable:
> > > + * parameters have been checked, will only change
> > > + * permissions of a regular page, and no concurrent
> > > + * SGX1/SGX2 ENCLS instructions since these
> > > + * are protected with mutex.
> > > + */
> > > + pr_err_once("EMODPR encountered exception %d\n",
> > > + ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret));
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + goto out_unlock;
> > > + }
> > > + if (encls_failed(ret)) {
> > > + modp->result = ret;
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + goto out_unlock;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + ret = sgx_enclave_etrack(encl);
> > > + if (ret) {
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + goto out_unlock;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + ret = 0;
> > > + goto out;
> > > +
> > > +out_unlock:
> > > + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> > > +out:
> > > + modp->count = c;
> > > +
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/**
> > > + * sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions() - handler for
> > > + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
> > > + * @encl: an enclave pointer
> > > + * @arg: userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions
> > > + * instance
> > > + *
> > > + * SGX2 distinguishes between relaxing and restricting the enclave page
> > > + * permissions maintained by the hardware (EPCM permissions) of pages
> > > + * belonging to an initialized enclave (after SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT).
> > > + *
> > > + * EPCM permissions cannot be restricted from within the enclave, the enclave
> > > + * requires the kernel to run the privileged level 0 instructions ENCLS[EMODPR]
> > > + * and ENCLS[ETRACK]. An attempt to relax EPCM permissions with this call
> > > + * will be ignored by the hardware.
> > > + *
> > > + * Return:
> > > + * - 0: Success
> > > + * - -errno: Otherwise
> > > + */
> > > +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl,
> > > + void __user *arg)
> > > +{
> > > + struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions params;
> > > + u64 secinfo_perm;
> > > + long ret;
> > > +
> > > + ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
> > > + if (ret)
> > > + return ret;
> > > +
> > > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, arg, sizeof(params)))
> > > + return -EFAULT;
> > > +
> > > + if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + ret = sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo((void __user *)params.secinfo,
> > > + &secinfo_perm);
> > > + if (ret)
> > > + return ret;
> > > +
> > > + if (params.result || params.count)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + ret = sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(encl, ¶ms, secinfo_perm);
> > > +
> > > + if (copy_to_user(arg, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
> > > + return -EFAULT;
> > > +
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> > > {
> > > struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data;
> > > @@ -681,6 +919,10 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> > > case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION:
> > > ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(encl, (void __user *)arg);
> > > break;
> > > + case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS:
> > > + ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(encl,
> > > + (void __user *)arg);
> > > + break;
> > > default:
> > > ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
> > > break;
> >
> > I think this a big improvement all things considered. I just put
> > a kernel building and see if I get this wired to our code:
> >
> > https://github.com/jarkkojs/aur-linux-sgx/actions/runs/2094084943
> >
> > I'll report my findings later on.
>
> I pulled the patches from sgx2_submitted_v3_plus_rwx branch. Just
> sanity checking that it is v3, correct?
I'm getting EINVAL with SECINFO that I think is legit:
let mut secinfo_buf: [u8; 64] = [0; 64]; // Initialize with zeros
secinfo_buf[0] = 1; // READ
secinfo_buf[1] = 2; // Regular
I made a small bpftrace script, and here's what happens:
$ cat sgx.bt
kretprobe:sgx_ioctl /retval != 0/
{
printf("sgx_ioctl: %d\n", retval)
}
kretprobe:sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo.constprop.0 /retval/
{
printf("sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo.constprop.0 %d\n", retval)
}
kretprobe:sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions /retval/
{
printf("sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions: %d\n", retval)
}
$ sudo bpftrace sgx.bt
[sudo] password for jarkko:
Attaching 3 probes...
sgx_perm_from_user_secinfo.constprop.0 -22
sgx_ioctl: -22
Could be that I'm doing something wrong but instantly do not see
anything obvious...
BR, Jarkko
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