linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V1 2/3] rpmsg: glink: Add lock to avoid race when rpmsg device is released

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Message-ID: <fef7733c-deb6-71a6-1b4f-3452257bc662@quicinc.com>
Date:   Thu, 7 Apr 2022 22:28:27 +0530
From:   Deepak Kumar Singh <quic_deesin@...cinc.com>
To:     Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@...aro.org>
CC:     <swboyd@...omium.org>, <quic_clew@...cinc.com>,
        <mathieu.poirier@...aro.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-remoteproc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Ohad Ben-Cohen" <ohad@...ery.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V1 2/3] rpmsg: glink: Add lock to avoid race when rpmsg
 device is released


On 3/12/2022 2:22 AM, Bjorn Andersson wrote:
> On Wed 26 Jan 13:04 CST 2022, Deepak Kumar Singh wrote:
>
>> When remote host goes down glink char device channel is freed,
>> At the same time user space apps can still try to open rpmsg_char
>> device which will result in calling rpmsg_create_ept. This may cause
>> reference to already freed context of glink chardev channel.
>>
> Hi Deepak,
>
> Could you please be a little bit more specific on the details of where
> you're seeing this race? Perhaps I'm just missing something obvious?

Crash is observed in reboot test case.

Log prints suggested that ept was destroyed just before crash in 
rpmsg_eptdev_create().

Below code was executed before crash -

static int rpmsg_eptdev_destroy(struct device *dev, void *data)
{
     struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev = dev_to_eptdev(dev);

     mutex_lock(&eptdev->ept_lock);
     if (eptdev->ept) {
         rpmsg_destroy_ept(eptdev->ept);
         eptdev->ept = NULL;
     }
     mutex_unlock(&eptdev->ept_lock);

     /* wake up any blocked readers */
     wake_up_interruptible(&eptdev->readq);

     device_del(&eptdev->dev);
     put_device(&eptdev->dev);

     return 0;
}

one crash was observed in rpmsg_eptdev_create() and other in 
rpmsg_eptdev_poll() -

1)

rpmsg_create_ept+0x40/0xa0
rpmsg_eptdev_open+0x88/0x138
chrdev_open+0xc4/0x1c8
do_dentry_open+0x230/0x378
vfs_open+0x3c/0x48
path_openat+0x93c/0xa78
do_filp_open+0x98/0x118
do_sys_openat2+0x90/0x220
do_sys_open+0x64/0x8c

2)

rpmsg_poll+0x5c/0x80
rpmsg_eptdev_poll+0x84/0xa4
do_sys_poll+0x22c/0x5c8

>> Use per ept lock to avoid race between rpmsg_destroy_ept and
>> rpmsg_destory_ept.
> I presume one of these should say rpmsg_eptdev_open().
yes, i will correct this in next patch.
> Regards,
> Bjorn
>
>> ---
>>   drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>>   1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c b/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c
>> index 72ee101..2108ef8 100644
>> --- a/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c
>> +++ b/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c
>> @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ static int rpmsg_eptdev_destroy(struct device *dev, void *data)
>>   	struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev = dev_to_eptdev(dev);
>>   
>>   	mutex_lock(&eptdev->ept_lock);
>> +	eptdev->rpdev = NULL;
>>   	if (eptdev->ept) {
>>   		rpmsg_destroy_ept(eptdev->ept);
>>   		eptdev->ept = NULL;
>> @@ -145,15 +146,24 @@ static int rpmsg_eptdev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
>>   
>>   	get_device(dev);
>>   
>> +	mutex_lock(&eptdev->ept_lock);
>> +	if (!eptdev->rpdev) {
>> +		put_device(dev);
>> +		mutex_unlock(&eptdev->ept_lock);
>> +		return -ENETRESET;
>> +	}
>> +
>>   	ept = rpmsg_create_ept(rpdev, rpmsg_ept_cb, eptdev, eptdev->chinfo);
>>   	if (!ept) {
>>   		dev_err(dev, "failed to open %s\n", eptdev->chinfo.name);
>> +		mutex_unlock(&eptdev->ept_lock);
>>   		put_device(dev);
>>   		return -EINVAL;
>>   	}
>>   
>>   	ept->sig_cb = rpmsg_sigs_cb;
>>   	eptdev->ept = ept;
>> +	mutex_unlock(&eptdev->ept_lock);
>>   	filp->private_data = eptdev;
>>   
>>   	return 0;
>> @@ -285,7 +295,9 @@ static __poll_t rpmsg_eptdev_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait)
>>   	if (eptdev->sig_pending)
>>   		mask |= EPOLLPRI;
>>   
>> +	mutex_lock(&eptdev->ept_lock);
>>   	mask |= rpmsg_poll(eptdev->ept, filp, wait);
>> +	mutex_unlock(&eptdev->ept_lock);
>>   
>>   	return mask;
>>   }
>> -- 
>> 2.7.4
>>