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Message-Id: <20220412124909.10467-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 20:49:08 +0800
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: x86@...nel.org, Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@...group.com>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH V2] x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@...group.com>
When returning to user space, the %rsp is user controlled value.
If it is SNP-guest and the hypervisor decides to mess with the code-page
for this path while a CPU is executing it. This will cause a #VC on
that CPU and that could hit in the syscall return path and mislead
the #VC handler.
So make ip_within_syscall_gap() return true in this case.
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@...group.com>
---
[V1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211213042215.3096-4-jiangshanlai@gmail.com/
Changed from V1:
Update changelog.
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 4 ++++
4 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 4faac48ebec5..4f678b6045cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -215,8 +215,10 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret:
popq %rdi
popq %rsp
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
swapgs
sysretq
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL_64)
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 4fdb007cddbd..3c0e14960e2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ sysret32_from_system_call:
* code. We zero R8-R10 to avoid info leaks.
*/
movq RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsp
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
/*
* The original userspace %rsp (RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)) is stored
@@ -314,6 +315,7 @@ sysret32_from_system_call:
xorl %r10d, %r10d
swapgs
sysretl
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
index 0f899c8d7a4e..647d71535ce3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ void syscall_init(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
void entry_SYSCALL_64(void);
void entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack(void);
+void entry_SYSRETQ_unsafe_stack(void);
+void entry_SYSRETQ_end(void);
long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2);
#endif
@@ -28,6 +30,8 @@ void entry_SYSENTER_compat(void);
void __end_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void);
void entry_SYSCALL_compat(void);
void entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack(void);
+void entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack(void);
+void entry_SYSRETL_compat_end(void);
void entry_INT80_compat(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
void xen_entry_INT80_compat(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
index 4357e0f2cd5f..f4db78b09c8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
@@ -186,9 +186,13 @@ static __always_inline bool ip_within_syscall_gap(struct pt_regs *regs)
bool ret = (regs->ip >= (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64 &&
regs->ip < (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack);
+ ret = ret || (regs->ip >= (unsigned long)entry_SYSRETQ_unsafe_stack &&
+ regs->ip < (unsigned long)entry_SYSRETQ_end);
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
ret = ret || (regs->ip >= (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat &&
regs->ip < (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack);
+ ret = ret || (regs->ip >= (unsigned long)entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack &&
+ regs->ip < (unsigned long)entry_SYSRETL_compat_end);
#endif
return ret;
--
2.19.1.6.gb485710b
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