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Message-Id: <20220413140528.3815-5-madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 09:05:25 -0500
From: madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com
To: mark.rutland@....com, broonie@...nel.org, jpoimboe@...hat.com,
ardb@...nel.org, nobuta.keiya@...itsu.com,
sjitindarsingh@...il.com, catalin.marinas@....com, will@...nel.org,
jmorris@...ei.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
live-patching@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH v14 4/7] arm64: Introduce stack trace reliability checks in the unwinder
From: "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>
There are some kernel features and conditions that make a stack trace
unreliable. Callers may require the unwinder to detect these cases.
E.g., livepatch.
Introduce a new function called unwind_check_reliability() that will
detect these cases and set a flag in the stack frame. Call
unwind_check_reliability() for every frame in unwind().
Introduce the first reliability check in unwind_check_reliability() - If
a return PC is not a valid kernel text address, consider the stack
trace unreliable. It could be some generated code. Other reliability checks
will be added in the future.
Let unwind() return a boolean to indicate if the stack trace is
reliable.
Signed-off-by: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c
index c749129aba5a..5ef2ce217324 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
* @final_fp: Pointer to the final frame.
*
* @failed: Unwind failed.
+ *
+ * @reliable: Stack trace is reliable.
*/
struct unwind_state {
unsigned long fp;
@@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ struct unwind_state {
struct task_struct *task;
unsigned long final_fp;
bool failed;
+ bool reliable;
};
static void unwind_init_common(struct unwind_state *state,
@@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ static void unwind_init_common(struct unwind_state *state,
state->prev_fp = 0;
state->prev_type = STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
state->failed = false;
+ state->reliable = true;
/* Stack trace terminates here. */
state->final_fp = (unsigned long)task_pt_regs(task)->stackframe;
@@ -242,11 +246,34 @@ static void notrace unwind_next(struct unwind_state *state)
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(unwind_next);
-static void notrace unwind(struct unwind_state *state,
+/*
+ * Check the stack frame for conditions that make further unwinding unreliable.
+ */
+static void unwind_check_reliability(struct unwind_state *state)
+{
+ if (state->fp == state->final_fp) {
+ /* Final frame; no more unwind, no need to check reliability */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the PC is not a known kernel text address, then we cannot
+ * be sure that a subsequent unwind will be reliable, as we
+ * don't know that the code follows our unwind requirements.
+ */
+ if (!__kernel_text_address(state->pc))
+ state->reliable = false;
+}
+
+static bool notrace unwind(struct unwind_state *state,
stack_trace_consume_fn consume_entry, void *cookie)
{
- while (unwind_continue(state, consume_entry, cookie))
+ unwind_check_reliability(state);
+ while (unwind_continue(state, consume_entry, cookie)) {
unwind_next(state);
+ unwind_check_reliability(state);
+ }
+ return !state->failed && state->reliable;
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(unwind);
--
2.25.1
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