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Message-ID: <fe209f25-6119-cc26-2608-8aaccf11ac36@amd.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2022 08:49:43 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Jacky Li <jackyli@...gle.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
John Allen <john.allen@....com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>, Alper Gun <alpergun@...gle.com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: ccp - Fix the INIT_EX data file open failure
On 4/14/22 11:23, Jacky Li wrote:
> There are 2 common cases when INIT_EX data file might not be
> opened successfully and fail the sev initialization:
>
> 1. In user namespaces, normal user tasks (e.g. VMM) can change their
> current->fs->root to point to arbitrary directories. While
> init_ex_path is provided as a module param related to root file
> system. Solution: use the root directory of init_task to avoid
> accessing the wrong file.
>
> 2. Normal user tasks (e.g. VMM) don't have the privilege to access
> the INIT_EX data file. Solution: open the file as root and
> restore permissions immediately.
>
> Fixes: 3d725965f836 ("crypto: ccp - Add SEV_INIT_EX support")
> Signed-off-by: Jacky Li <jackyli@...gle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
Looks good, just a quick question. Should there be any type of access
checks before switching credentials? Should we check access to /dev/sev or
such? Or is the capability to load the module enough?
Thanks,
Tom
> ---
> Changelog since v1:
> - Added Fixes tag and Reviewed-By tag.
>
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
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