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Message-ID: <YlsZxVjgt3ZNQ7Ub@Red>
Date: Sat, 16 Apr 2022 21:32:21 +0200
From: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@...il.com>
To: Samuel Holland <samuel@...lland.org>
Cc: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@...ech.de>, palmer@...belt.com,
paul.walmsley@...ive.com, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, wefu@...hat.com, guoren@...nel.org,
atishp@...shpatra.org, anup@...infault.org, mick@....forth.gr,
cmuellner@...ux.com, philipp.tomsich@...ll.eu,
herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] riscv: implement Zicbom-based CMO instructions + the
t-head variant
Le Sat, Apr 16, 2022 at 12:47:29PM -0500, Samuel Holland a écrit :
> On 4/16/22 2:35 AM, Corentin Labbe wrote:
> > Le Fri, Apr 15, 2022 at 09:19:23PM -0500, Samuel Holland a écrit :
> >> On 4/15/22 6:26 AM, Corentin Labbe wrote:
> >>> Le Mon, Mar 07, 2022 at 11:46:18PM +0100, Heiko Stuebner a écrit :
> >>>> This series is based on the alternatives changes done in my svpbmt series
> >>>> and thus also depends on Atish's isa-extension parsing series.
> >>>>
> >>>> It implements using the cache-management instructions from the Zicbom-
> >>>> extension to handle cache flush, etc actions on platforms needing them.
> >>>>
> >>>> SoCs using cpu cores from T-Head like the Allwinne D1 implement a
> >>>> different set of cache instructions. But while they are different,
> >>>> instructions they provide the same functionality, so a variant can
> >>>> easly hook into the existing alternatives mechanism on those.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> Hello
> >>>
> >>> I am testing https://github.com/smaeul/linux.git branch:origin/riscv/d1-wip which contain this serie.
> >>>
> >>> I am hitting a buffer corruption problem with DMA.
> >>> The sun8i-ce crypto driver fail self tests due to "device overran destination buffer".
> >>> In fact the buffer is not overran by device but by dma_map_single() operation.
> >>>
> >>> The following small code show the problem:
> >>>
> >>> dma_addr_t dma;
> >>> u8 *buf;
> >>> #define BSIZE 2048
> >>> #define DMASIZE 16
> >>>
> >>> buf = kmalloc(BSIZE, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> >>> for (i = 0; i < BSIZE; i++)
> >>> buf[i] = 0xFE;
> >>> print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "DMATEST1:", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 4, buf, 256, false);
> >>> dma = dma_map_single(ce->dev, buf, DMASIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> >>
> >> This function (through dma_direct_map_page()) ends up calling
> >> arch_sync_dma_for_device(..., ..., DMA_FROM_DEVICE), which invalidates the CPU's
> >> cache. This is the same thing other architectures do (at least arm, arm64,
> >> openrisc, and powerpc). So this appears to be working as intended.
> >
> > This behavour is not present at least on ARM and ARM64.
> > The sample code I provided does not corrupt the buffer on them.
>
> That can be explained by the 0xFE bytes having been flushed to DRAM already in
> your ARM/ARM64 tests, whereas in your riscv64 case, the 0xFE bytes were still in
> a dirty cache line. The cache topology and implementation is totally different
> across the SoCs, so this is not too surprising.
>
> Semantically, dma_map_single(..., DMA_FROM_DEVICE) means you are doing a
> unidirectional DMA transfer from the device into that buffer. So the contents of
> the buffer are "undefined" until the DMA transfer completes. If you are also
> writing data into the buffer from the CPU side, then you need DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL.
>
> Regards,
> Samuel
+CC crypto mailing list + maintainer
My problem is that crypto selftest, for each buffer where I need to do a cipher operation,
concat a poison buffer to check that device does write beyond buffer.
But the dma_map_sg(FROM_DEVICE) corrupts this poison buffer and crypto selftests fails thinking my device did a buffer overrun.
So you mean that on SoC D1, this crypto API check strategy is impossible ?
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