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Message-Id: <20220418121207.509248418@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 14:14:27 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Tobias Brunner <tobias@...ongswan.org>,
Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>,
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 201/218] xfrm: policy: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
commit 4f47e8ab6ab796b5380f74866fa5287aca4dcc58 upstream.
In commit ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"),
it would take 'priority' to make a policy unique, and allow duplicated
policies with different 'priority' to be added, which is not expected
by userland, as Tobias reported in strongswan.
To fix this duplicated policies issue, and also fix the issue in
commit ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"),
when doing add/del/get/update on user interfaces, this patch is to change
to look up a policy with both mark and mask by doing:
mark.v == pol->mark.v && mark.m == pol->mark.m
and leave the check:
(mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v
for tx/rx path only.
As the userland expects an exact mark and mask match to manage policies.
v1->v2:
- make xfrm_policy_mark_match inline and fix the changelog as
Tobias suggested.
Fixes: 295fae568885 ("xfrm: Allow user space manipulation of SPD mark")
Fixes: ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list")
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@...ongswan.org>
Tested-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@...ongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 9 ++++++---
net/key/af_key.c | 4 ++--
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 14 ++++++++------
4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1595,13 +1595,16 @@ int xfrm_policy_walk(struct net *net, st
void *);
void xfrm_policy_walk_done(struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk, struct net *net);
int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct xfrm_policy *policy, int excl);
-struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, u32 mark,
+struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net,
+ const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
u8 type, int dir,
struct xfrm_selector *sel,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, int delete,
int *err);
-struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net, u32 mark, u8, int dir,
- u32 id, int delete, int *err);
+struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net,
+ const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ u8 type, int dir, u32 id, int delete,
+ int *err);
int xfrm_policy_flush(struct net *net, u8 type, bool task_valid);
void xfrm_policy_hash_rebuild(struct net *net);
u32 xfrm_get_acqseq(void);
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -2434,7 +2434,7 @@ static int pfkey_spddelete(struct sock *
return err;
}
- xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, DUMMY_MARK, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
+ xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, &dummy_mark, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
pol->sadb_x_policy_dir - 1, &sel, pol_ctx,
1, &err);
security_xfrm_policy_free(pol_ctx);
@@ -2687,7 +2687,7 @@ static int pfkey_spdget(struct sock *sk,
return -EINVAL;
delete = (hdr->sadb_msg_type == SADB_X_SPDDELETE2);
- xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, DUMMY_MARK, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
+ xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, &dummy_mark, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
dir, pol->sadb_x_policy_id, delete, &err);
if (xp == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -754,14 +754,10 @@ static void xfrm_policy_requeue(struct x
spin_unlock_bh(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
}
-static bool xfrm_policy_mark_match(struct xfrm_policy *policy,
- struct xfrm_policy *pol)
+static inline bool xfrm_policy_mark_match(const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ struct xfrm_policy *pol)
{
- if (policy->mark.v == pol->mark.v &&
- policy->priority == pol->priority)
- return true;
-
- return false;
+ return mark->v == pol->mark.v && mark->m == pol->mark.m;
}
int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct xfrm_policy *policy, int excl)
@@ -779,7 +775,7 @@ int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct x
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst) {
if (pol->type == policy->type &&
!selector_cmp(&pol->selector, &policy->selector) &&
- xfrm_policy_mark_match(policy, pol) &&
+ xfrm_policy_mark_match(&policy->mark, pol) &&
xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security, policy->security) &&
!WARN_ON(delpol)) {
if (excl) {
@@ -830,8 +826,8 @@ int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct x
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_insert);
-struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, u32 mark, u8 type,
- int dir, struct xfrm_selector *sel,
+struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ u8 type, int dir, struct xfrm_selector *sel,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, int delete,
int *err)
{
@@ -844,7 +840,7 @@ struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ct
ret = NULL;
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst) {
if (pol->type == type &&
- (mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v &&
+ xfrm_policy_mark_match(mark, pol) &&
!selector_cmp(sel, &pol->selector) &&
xfrm_sec_ctx_match(ctx, pol->security)) {
xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
@@ -869,8 +865,8 @@ struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ct
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx);
-struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net, u32 mark, u8 type,
- int dir, u32 id, int delete, int *err)
+struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ u8 type, int dir, u32 id, int delete, int *err)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol, *ret;
struct hlist_head *chain;
@@ -885,7 +881,7 @@ struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(str
ret = NULL;
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, byidx) {
if (pol->type == type && pol->index == id &&
- (mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v) {
+ xfrm_policy_mark_match(mark, pol)) {
xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
if (delete) {
*err = security_xfrm_policy_delete(
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1777,7 +1777,6 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buf
struct km_event c;
int delete;
struct xfrm_mark m;
- u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
delete = nlh->nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY;
@@ -1790,8 +1789,10 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buf
if (err)
return err;
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+
if (p->index)
- xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, mark, type, p->dir, p->index, delete, &err);
+ xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, &m, type, p->dir, p->index, delete, &err);
else {
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX];
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
@@ -1808,7 +1809,7 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buf
if (err)
return err;
}
- xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, mark, type, p->dir, &p->sel,
+ xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, &m, type, p->dir, &p->sel,
ctx, delete, &err);
security_xfrm_policy_free(ctx);
}
@@ -2072,7 +2073,6 @@ static int xfrm_add_pol_expire(struct sk
u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN;
int err = -ENOENT;
struct xfrm_mark m;
- u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
err = copy_from_user_policy_type(&type, attrs);
if (err)
@@ -2082,8 +2082,10 @@ static int xfrm_add_pol_expire(struct sk
if (err)
return err;
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+
if (p->index)
- xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, mark, type, p->dir, p->index, 0, &err);
+ xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, &m, type, p->dir, p->index, 0, &err);
else {
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX];
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
@@ -2100,7 +2102,7 @@ static int xfrm_add_pol_expire(struct sk
if (err)
return err;
}
- xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, mark, type, p->dir,
+ xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, &m, type, p->dir,
&p->sel, ctx, 0, &err);
security_xfrm_policy_free(ctx);
}
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