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Message-ID: <f40fe89d9b978d525ed5d56b0679d1c20b10864b.camel@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 10:21:55 +1200
From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@...hat.com>,
Mark Gross <mgross@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] platform/x86: intel_tdx_attest: Add TDX Guest
attestation interface driver
On Tue, 2022-04-19 at 07:13 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 4/19/22 00:47, Kai Huang wrote:
> > > From security's perspective, attestation is an essential part of TDX. That
> > being said, w/o attestation support in TD guest, I guess nobody will seriously
> > use TD guest.
>
> Are you saying you can't think of a single threat model where there's a
> benefit to running a TDX guest without attestation? Will TDX only be
> used in environments where secrets are provisioned to guests on the
> basis of attestation?
>
> >
I don't think anyone should provision secret to a TD before it get attested that
it is a genuine TD that he/she expected. If someone does that, he/she takes the
risk of losing the secret. Of course if someone just want to try a TD then w/o
attestation is totally fine.
--
Thanks,
-Kai
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