linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 4/6] virtio: Various updates to xen-virtio DMA ops layer

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Tue, 19 Apr 2022 08:58:20 +0200
From:   Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
To:     Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
        Oleksandr <olekstysh@...il.com>
Cc:     xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>,
        Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Julien Grall <julien@....org>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 4/6] virtio: Various updates to xen-virtio DMA ops
 layer

On 18.04.22 21:11, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Sun, 17 Apr 2022, Oleksandr wrote:
>> On 16.04.22 01:02, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>>> On Thu, 14 Apr 2022, Oleksandr Tyshchenko wrote:
>>>> From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>
>>>>
>>>> In the context of current patch do the following:
>>>> 1. Update code to support virtio-mmio devices
>>>> 2. Introduce struct xen_virtio_data and account passed virtio devices
>>>>      (using list) as we need to store some per-device data
>>>> 3. Add multi-page support for xen_virtio_dma_map(unmap)_page callbacks
>>>> 4. Harden code against malicious backend
>>>> 5. Change to use alloc_pages_exact() instead of __get_free_pages()
>>>> 6. Introduce locking scheme to protect mappings (I am not 100% sure
>>>>      whether per-device lock is really needed)
>>>> 7. Handle virtio device's DMA mask
>>>> 8. Retrieve the ID of backend domain from DT for virtio-mmio device
>>>>      instead of hardcoding it.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c |  11 +++
>>>>    drivers/xen/Kconfig      |   2 +-
>>>>    drivers/xen/xen-virtio.c | 200
>>>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>>>    include/xen/xen-ops.h    |   5 ++
>>>>    4 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c
>>>> index ec5b082..870d92f 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c
>>>> @@ -409,6 +409,17 @@ int __init arch_xen_unpopulated_init(struct resource
>>>> **res)
>>>>    }
>>>>    #endif
>>>>    +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
>>>> +int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_HVM_VIRTIO_GRANT) && xen_hvm_domain())
>>>> +		return 1;
>>> Instead of xen_hvm_domain(), you can just use xen_domain(). Also there
>>> is no need for the #ifdef
>>> CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS, given that:
>>>
>>> CONFIG_XEN_HVM_VIRTIO_GRANT depends on XEN_VIRTIO which selects
>>> ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
>>
>>
>> Yes, but please see my comments in commit #2 regarding
>> CONFIG_XEN_HVM_VIRTIO_GRANT option and
>> arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access() on Arm.
>>
>> I propose to have the following on Arm:
>>
>> int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
>> {
>>       return xen_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
>> }
>>
>>
>> where common xen.h contain a helper to be used by both Arm and x86:
>>
>> static inline int xen_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
>> {
>>       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO) && (xen_pv_domain() ||
>> xen_hvm_domain()))
>>           return 1;
>>
>>       return 0;
>> }
>>
>>
>> But I would be happy with what you propose as well.
> 
> As I wrote in the previous reply, I also prefer to share the code
> between x86 and ARM, and I think it could look like:
> 
> int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
> {
>       return xen_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
> }
> [...]
> static inline int xen_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
> {
>       return (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO) && xen_domain());
> }
> 
> But let's check with Juergen and Boris.
> 
> 
>>>> +	return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access);
>>>> +#endif
>>>> +
>>>>    static void __init xen_dt_guest_init(void)
>>>>    {
>>>>    	struct device_node *xen_node;
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/xen/Kconfig b/drivers/xen/Kconfig
>>>> index fc61f7a..56afe6a 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/xen/Kconfig
>>>> +++ b/drivers/xen/Kconfig
>>>> @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ config XEN_VIRTIO
>>>>      config XEN_HVM_VIRTIO_GRANT
>>>>    	bool "Require virtio for fully virtualized guests to use grant
>>>> mappings"
>>>> -	depends on XEN_VIRTIO && X86_64
>>>> +	depends on XEN_VIRTIO && (X86_64 || ARM || ARM64)
>>> you can remove the architectural dependencies
>>
>>
>> According to the conversation in commit #2 we are considering just a single
>> XEN_VIRTIO option, but it is going to has the
>> same architectural dependencies: (X86_64 || ARM || ARM64)
>>
>> By removing the architectural dependencies here, we will leave also X86_32
>> covered (neither XEN_HVM_VIRTIO_GRANT nor XEN_PV_VIRTIO covered it). I don't
>> know whether it is ok or not.
>>
>> Shall I remove dependencies anyway?
> 
> No, good point. I don't know about X86_32. This is another detail where
> Juergen or Boris should comment.

X86_32 should in theory work (it is HVM/PVH only, as PV 32-bit guests are no
longer supported).


Juergen

Download attachment "OpenPGP_0xB0DE9DD628BF132F.asc" of type "application/pgp-keys" (3099 bytes)

Download attachment "OpenPGP_signature" of type "application/pgp-signature" (496 bytes)