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Message-ID: <147f68f6-7d67-1884-bd14-5040639b3396@suse.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 11:14:52 +0200
From: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc: Oleksandr <olekstysh@...il.com>, xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
Julien Grall <julien@....org>,
Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V1 3/6] xen/virtio: Add option to restrict memory access
under Xen
On 25.04.22 09:58, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 09:47:49AM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
>>> Would the Xen specific bits fit into Confidential Computing Platform
>>> checks? I will let Juergen/Boris comment on this.
>>
>> I don't think cc_platform_has would be correct here. Xen certainly
>> provides more isolation between guests and dom0, but "Confidential
>> Computing" is basically orthogonal to that feature.
>
> The point of cc_platform_has is to remove all these open code checks.
> If a Xen hypervisor / dom0 can't access arbitrary guest memory for
> virtual I/O and we need special APIs for that it certainly false
> into the scope of cc_platform_has, even if the confientiality is
> rather limited.
In case the x86 maintainers are fine with that I won't oppose.
Juergen
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