linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 7/7] fsverity: update the documentation

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <d3f6dad3-3f0a-481d-3067-36c0a4ea279f@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Fri, 29 Apr 2022 13:42:55 -0400
From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 7/7] fsverity: update the documentation



On 4/29/22 07:26, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Update the fsverity documentation related to IMA signature support.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> ---
>   Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 35 +++++++++++++++++---------
>   1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
> index 8cc536d08f51..b7d42fd65e9d 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
> @@ -70,12 +70,23 @@ must live on a read-write filesystem because they are independently
>   updated and potentially user-installed, so dm-verity cannot be used.
>   
>   The base fs-verity feature is a hashing mechanism only; actually
> -authenticating the files is up to userspace.  However, to meet some
> -users' needs, fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature
> -verification mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require
> -that all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring; see
> -`Built-in signature verification`_.  Support for fs-verity file hashes
> -in IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) policies is also planned.
> +authenticating the files may be done by:
> +
> +* Userspace-only
> +
> +* Builtin signature verification + userspace policy
> +
> +  fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature verification
> +  mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require that
> +  all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring;
> +  see `Built-in signature verification`_.
> +
> +* Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
> +
> +  IMA supports including fs-verity file digests and signatures in the
> +  IMA measurement list and verifying fs-verity based file signatures
> +  stored as security.ima xattrs, based on policy.
> +
>   
>   User API
>   ========
> @@ -653,12 +664,12 @@ weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
>       hashed and what to do with those hashes, such as log them,
>       authenticate them, or add them to a measurement list.
>   
> -    IMA is planned to support the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an
> -    alternative to doing full file hashes, for people who want the
> -    performance and security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash.
> -    But it doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be
> -    through IMA.  As a standalone filesystem feature, fs-verity
> -    already meets many users' needs, and it's testable like other
> +    IMA supports the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an alternative
> +    to full file hashes, for those who want the performance and
> +    security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash.  However, it
> +    doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be through
> +    IMA.  fs-verity already meets many users' needs even as a
> +    standalone filesystem feature, and it's testable like other
>       filesystem features e.g. with xfstests.
>   
>   :Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just modify the

Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>