linux-kernel - [PATCH v8 7/7] fsverity: update the documentation

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 29 Apr 2022 07:26:01 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v8 7/7] fsverity: update the documentation

Update the fsverity documentation related to IMA signature support.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 35 +++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
index 8cc536d08f51..b7d42fd65e9d 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
@@ -70,12 +70,23 @@ must live on a read-write filesystem because they are independently
 updated and potentially user-installed, so dm-verity cannot be used.
 
 The base fs-verity feature is a hashing mechanism only; actually
-authenticating the files is up to userspace.  However, to meet some
-users' needs, fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature
-verification mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require
-that all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring; see
-`Built-in signature verification`_.  Support for fs-verity file hashes
-in IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) policies is also planned.
+authenticating the files may be done by:
+
+* Userspace-only
+
+* Builtin signature verification + userspace policy
+
+  fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature verification
+  mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require that
+  all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring;
+  see `Built-in signature verification`_.
+
+* Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
+
+  IMA supports including fs-verity file digests and signatures in the
+  IMA measurement list and verifying fs-verity based file signatures
+  stored as security.ima xattrs, based on policy.
+
 
 User API
 ========
@@ -653,12 +664,12 @@ weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
     hashed and what to do with those hashes, such as log them,
     authenticate them, or add them to a measurement list.
 
-    IMA is planned to support the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an
-    alternative to doing full file hashes, for people who want the
-    performance and security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash.
-    But it doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be
-    through IMA.  As a standalone filesystem feature, fs-verity
-    already meets many users' needs, and it's testable like other
+    IMA supports the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an alternative
+    to full file hashes, for those who want the performance and
+    security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash.  However, it
+    doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be through
+    IMA.  fs-verity already meets many users' needs even as a
+    standalone filesystem feature, and it's testable like other
     filesystem features e.g. with xfstests.
 
 :Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just modify the
-- 
2.27.0