linux-kernel - [PATCH] random: mix in timestamps and reseed on system restore

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Message-Id: <20220501123849.3858-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date:   Sun,  1 May 2022 14:38:49 +0200
From:   "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Subject: [PATCH] random: mix in timestamps and reseed on system restore

Since the RNG loses freshness system suspend/hibernation, when we
resume, immediately reseed using whatever data we can, which for this
particular case is the various timestamps regarding system suspend time,
in addition to more generally the RDSEED/RDRAND/RDTSC values that happen
whenever the crng reseeds.

On systems that suspend and resume automatically all the time -- such as
Android -- we skip the reseeding on suspend resumption, since that could
wind up being far too busy. This is the same trade-off made in
WireGuard.

In addition to reseeding upon resumption always mix into the pool these
various stamps on every power notification event.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 0935a140795e..48eac27214ea 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <linux/completion.h>
 #include <linux/uuid.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <crypto/chacha.h>
 #include <crypto/blake2s.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -966,6 +967,37 @@ static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
 early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
 early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
 
+static int random_pm_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data)
+{
+	unsigned long flags, entropy = random_get_entropy();
+
+	/*
+	 * Encode a representation of how long the system has been suspended,
+	 * in a way that is distinct from prior system suspends.
+	 */
+	ktime_t stamps[] = {
+		ktime_get(),
+		ktime_get_boottime(),
+		ktime_get_real()
+	};
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&action, sizeof(action));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(stamps, sizeof(stamps));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+
+	if (action == PM_RESTORE_PREPARE ||
+	    (action == PM_POST_SUSPEND &&
+	     !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PM_AUTOSLEEP) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ANDROID))) {
+		crng_reseed(true);
+		pr_notice("crng reseeded on system resumption\n");
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block pm_notifier = { .notifier_call = random_pm_notification };
+
 /*
  * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
  * are still turned off. Here we push in RDSEED, a timestamp, and utsname().
@@ -1009,6 +1041,8 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)
 		unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
 	}
 
+	WARN_ON(register_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier));
+
 	WARN(!random_get_entropy(), "Missing cycle counter and fallback timer; RNG "
 				    "entropy collection will consequently suffer.");
 	return 0;
-- 
2.35.1