linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] objtool: Fix SLS checks

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Message-ID: <YnA8Yw19AQV28w54@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date:   Mon, 2 May 2022 22:17:39 +0200
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] objtool: Fix SLS checks

On Mon, May 02, 2022 at 11:15:47AM -0700, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:

> From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
> Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Mitigate SLS for JMP_NOSPEC with retpolines disabled
> 
> Having disabled retpolines doesn't necessarily mean the user doesn't
> care about straight-line speculation.  For example, retpolines are
> disabled when eIBRS is used.
> 
> If CONFIG_SLS is enabled, properly mitigate SLS for JMP_NOSPEC for the
> retpolines disabled cases.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 ++++++++++---
>  tools/objtool/check.c                |  3 ---
>  2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> index acbaeaf83b61..0648746bf60b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,13 @@
>  	.popsection
>  .endm
>  
> +.macro INDIRECT_JMP reg
> +	jmp *%\reg
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
> +	int3
> +#endif
> +.endm
> +
>  /*
>   * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
>   * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
> @@ -82,11 +89,11 @@
>   */
>  .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
>  #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> -	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \
> +	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; INDIRECT_JMP \reg), \
>  		      __stringify(jmp __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
> -		      __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
> +		      __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; INDIRECT_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
>  #else
> -	jmp	*%\reg
> +	INDIRECT_JMP \reg
>  #endif
>  .endm
>  
> diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
> index e7983c3e2408..3cf3ad0b5db5 100644
> --- a/tools/objtool/check.c
> +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
> @@ -3842,9 +3842,6 @@ static int validate_sls(struct objtool_file *file)
>  	for_each_insn(file, insn) {
>  		next_insn = next_insn_same_sec(file, insn);
>  
> -		if (insn->retpoline_safe)
> -			continue;
> -
>  		switch (insn->type) {
>  		case INSN_RETURN:
>  			if (!next_insn || next_insn->type != INSN_TRAP) {

Yes, agreed. But perhaps with something like this on top?

---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 3c66073e7645..84beeb5297d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -452,6 +452,17 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes)
 		return ret;
 	i += ret;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+	/*
+	 * Ideally this would be unconditional, except in case of
+	 * RETPOLINE_LFENCE we don't have sufficient space. Additionally,
+	 * -mharden-sls=all should be extended to emit INT3 after
+	 * direct jumps too, which will then cover that case.
+	 */
+	if (i < insn->length)
+		bytes[i++] = INT3_INSN_OPCODE;
+#endif
+
 	for (; i < insn->length;)
 		bytes[i++] = BYTES_NOP1;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index b2b2366885a2..26e742da3129 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 
-	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; INDIRECT_JMP \reg), \
 		      __stringify(RETPOLINE \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
-		      __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg; int3), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
+		      __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; INDIRECT_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
 
 .endm
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 16b6efacf7c6..6929856e7f6d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -418,6 +418,10 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
 #endif
 	EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+	EMIT1(0xCC);
+#endif
+
 	*pprog = prog;
 }