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Message-ID: <CAG_fn=XVchXCcOhFt+rP=vinRhkyrXJSP46cyvcZeHJWaDquGg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 6 May 2022 16:52:33 +0200
From:   Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc:     Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
        Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        Linux-Arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 28/46] kmsan: entry: handle register passing from
 uninstrumented code

On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 11:56 PM Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> wrote:
>
> Alexander,
>
> On Thu, May 05 2022 at 20:04, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> > On Tue, May 3, 2022 at 12:00 AM Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> wrote:
> >> > Regarding the regs, you are right. It should be enough to unpoison the
> >> > regs at idtentry prologue instead.
> >> > I tried that initially, but IIRC it required patching each of the
> >> > DEFINE_IDTENTRY_XXX macros, which already use instrumentation_begin().
> >>
> >> Exactly 4 instances :)
> >>
> >
> > Not really, I had to add a call to `kmsan_unpoison_memory(regs,
> > sizeof(*regs));` to the following places in
> > arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:
> > - DEFINE_IDTENTRY()
> > - DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE()
> > - DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW()
> > - DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE()
> > - DEFINE_IDTENTRY_IRQ()
> > - DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC()
> > - DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC_SIMPLE()
> > - DEFINE_IDTENTRY_DF()
> >
> > , but even that wasn't enough. For some reason I also had to unpoison
> > pt_regs directly in
> > DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt) and
> > DEFINE_IDTENTRY_IRQ(common_interrupt).
> > In the latter case, this could have been caused by
> > asm_common_interrupt being entered from irq_entries_start(), but I am
> > not sure what is so special about sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt().
> >
> > Ideally, it would be great to find that single point where pt_regs are
> > set up before being passed to all IDT entries.
> > I used to do that by inserting calls to kmsan_unpoison_memory right
> > into arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> > (https://github.com/google/kmsan/commit/3b0583f45f74f3a09f4c7e0e0588169cef918026),
> > but that required storing/restoring all GP registers. Maybe there's a
> > better way?
>
> Yes. Something like this should cover all exceptions and syscalls before
> anything instrumentable can touch @regs. Anything up to those points is
> either off-limit for instrumentation or does not deal with @regs.
>
> --- a/kernel/entry/common.c
> +++ b/kernel/entry/common.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static __always_inline void __enter_from
>         user_exit_irqoff();
>
>         instrumentation_begin();
> +       unpoison(regs);
>         trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
>         instrumentation_end();
>  }
> @@ -352,6 +353,7 @@ noinstr irqentry_state_t irqentry_enter(
>                 lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
>                 rcu_irq_enter();
>                 instrumentation_begin();
> +               unpoison(regs);
>                 trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
>                 instrumentation_end();
>
> @@ -367,6 +369,7 @@ noinstr irqentry_state_t irqentry_enter(
>          */
>         lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
>         instrumentation_begin();
> +       unpoison(regs);
>         rcu_irq_enter_check_tick();
>         trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
>         instrumentation_end();
> @@ -452,6 +455,7 @@ irqentry_state_t noinstr irqentry_nmi_en
>         rcu_nmi_enter();
>
>         instrumentation_begin();
> +       unpoison(regs);
>         trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
>         ftrace_nmi_enter();
>         instrumentation_end();
>
> As I said: 4 places :)

These four instances still do not look sufficient.
Right now I am seeing e.g. reports with the following stack trace:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in irqtime_account_process_tick+0x255/0x580
kernel/sched/cputime.c:382
 irqtime_account_process_tick+0x255/0x580 kernel/sched/cputime.c:382
 account_process_tick+0x98/0x450 kernel/sched/cputime.c:476
 update_process_times+0xe4/0x3e0 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
 tick_sched_handle kernel/time/tick-sched.c:243
 tick_sched_timer+0x83e/0x9e0 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1473
 __run_hrtimer+0x518/0xe50 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1685
 __hrtimer_run_queues kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1749
 hrtimer_interrupt+0x838/0x15a0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1811
 local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1086
 __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1ae/0x680 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1103
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x95/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1097
...
(uninit creation stack trace is irrelevant here, because it is some
random value from the stack)

sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt() receives struct pt_regs from
uninstrumented code, so regs can be partially uninitialized.
They are not passed down the call stack directly, but are instead
saved by set_irq_regs() in sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt() and loaded by
get_irq_regs() in tick_sched_timer().

The remaining false positives can be fixed by unpoisoning the
registers in set_irq_regs():

 static inline struct pt_regs *set_irq_regs(struct pt_regs *new_regs)
 {
        struct pt_regs *old_regs;
+       kmsan_unpoison_memory(new_regs, sizeof(*new_regs));

        old_regs = __this_cpu_read(__irq_regs);
        __this_cpu_write(__irq_regs, new_regs);

Does that sound viable? Is it correct to assume that set_irq_regs() is
always called for registers received from non-instrumented code?

(It seems that just unpoisoning registers in set_irq_regs() is not
enough, i.e. we still need to do what you suggest in
kernel/entry/common.c)
--
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
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