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Message-ID: <20220506160820.GB1060@bug>
Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 18:08:20 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Evan Green <evgreen@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@...ora.tech>, dlunev@...gle.com,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, corbet@....net, rjw@...ysocki.net,
gwendal@...omium.org, jarkko@...nel.org, linux-pm@...r.kernel.org,
Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/10] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate
Hi!
> One annoyance of the "preloading" scheme is that hibernate image memory
> is effectively double-allocated: first by the usermode process pulling
> encrypted contents off of disk and holding it, and second by the kernel
> in its giant allocation in prepare_image(). An interesting future
> optimization would be to allow the kernel to accept and store encrypted
> page data before the user key is available. This would remove the
> double allocation problem, as usermode could push the encrypted pages
> loaded from disk immediately without storing them. The kernel could defer
> decryption of the data until the user key is available, while still
> knowing the correct page locations to store the encrypted data in.
Um. Dunno. Won't you run out of memory? Hibernation images can be quite big...
Best regards,
Pavel
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