linux-kernel - [PATCH V2 4/7] xen/virtio: Enable restricted memory access using Xen grant mappings

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Message-Id: <1651947548-4055-5-git-send-email-olekstysh@gmail.com>
Date:   Sat,  7 May 2022 21:19:05 +0300
From:   Oleksandr Tyshchenko <olekstysh@...il.com>
To:     xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>,
        Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
        Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Julien Grall <julien@....org>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Subject: [PATCH V2 4/7] xen/virtio: Enable restricted memory access using Xen grant mappings

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>

In order to support virtio in Xen guests add a config option XEN_VIRTIO
enabling the user to specify whether in all Xen guests virtio should
be able to access memory via Xen grant mappings only on the host side.

Also set PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS feature from the guest
initialization code on Arm and x86 if CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>
---
Changes V1 -> V2:
   - new patch, split required changes from commit:
    "[PATCH V1 3/6] xen/virtio: Add option to restrict memory access under Xen"
   - rework according to new platform_has() infrastructure
---
 arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c     |  2 ++
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c |  2 ++
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c  |  2 ++
 drivers/xen/Kconfig          | 11 +++++++++++
 include/xen/xen.h            |  8 ++++++++
 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c
index 07eb69f..1f9c3ba 100644
--- a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c
@@ -443,6 +443,8 @@ static int __init xen_guest_init(void)
 	if (!xen_domain())
 		return 0;
 
+	xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
+
 	if (!acpi_disabled)
 		xen_acpi_guest_init();
 	else
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
index 517a9d8..8b71b1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_guest_init(void)
 	if (xen_pv_domain())
 		return;
 
+	xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
+
 	init_hvm_pv_info();
 
 	reserve_shared_info();
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 5038edb..fcd5d5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tls_descs, shadow_tls_desc);
 
 static void __init xen_pv_init_platform(void)
 {
+	xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
+
 	populate_extra_pte(fix_to_virt(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP));
 
 	set_fixmap(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP, xen_start_info->shared_info);
diff --git a/drivers/xen/Kconfig b/drivers/xen/Kconfig
index 313a9127..a7bd8ce 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/xen/Kconfig
@@ -339,4 +339,15 @@ config XEN_GRANT_DMA_OPS
 	bool
 	select DMA_OPS
 
+config XEN_VIRTIO
+	bool "Xen virtio support"
+	depends on VIRTIO
+	select XEN_GRANT_DMA_OPS
+	help
+	  Enable virtio support for running as Xen guest. Depending on the
+	  guest type this will require special support on the backend side
+	  (qemu or kernel, depending on the virtio device types used).
+
+	  If in doubt, say n.
+
 endmenu
diff --git a/include/xen/xen.h b/include/xen/xen.h
index a99bab8..0780a81 100644
--- a/include/xen/xen.h
+++ b/include/xen/xen.h
@@ -52,6 +52,14 @@ bool xen_biovec_phys_mergeable(const struct bio_vec *vec1,
 extern u64 xen_saved_max_mem_size;
 #endif
 
+#include <linux/platform-feature.h>
+
+static inline void xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO) && xen_domain())
+		platform_set(PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_UNPOPULATED_ALLOC
 int xen_alloc_unpopulated_pages(unsigned int nr_pages, struct page **pages);
 void xen_free_unpopulated_pages(unsigned int nr_pages, struct page **pages);
-- 
2.7.4