linux-kernel - [PATCH 2/3] KVM: x86/svm/pmu: Direct access pmu->gp_counter[] to implement amd_*_to

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Date:   Tue, 10 May 2022 19:57:17 +0800
From:   Like Xu <like.xu.linux@...il.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, sandipan.das@....com,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] KVM: x86/svm/pmu: Direct access pmu->gp_counter[] to implement amd_*_to_pmc()

From: Like Xu <likexu@...cent.com>

AMD only has gp counters, whose corresponding vPMCs are initialised
and stored in pmu->gp_counter[] in order of idx, so we can access this
array directly based on any valid pmc->idx, without any help from other
interfaces at all. The amd_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc() can now reuse this part
of the code quite naturally.

Opportunistically apply array_index_nospec() to reduce the attack
surface for speculative execution.

Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@...cent.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/pmu.c | 36 +++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/pmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/pmu.c
index 68b9e22c84d2..4668baf762d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/pmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/pmu.c
@@ -45,6 +45,16 @@ static struct kvm_event_hw_type_mapping amd_event_mapping[] = {
 	[7] = { 0xd1, 0x00, PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND },
 };
 
+static struct kvm_pmc *amd_pmc_idx_to_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, int pmc_idx)
+{
+	unsigned int num_counters = pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters;
+
+	if (pmc_idx >= num_counters)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return &pmu->gp_counters[array_index_nospec(pmc_idx, num_counters)];
+}
+
 static unsigned int get_msr_base(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, enum pmu_type type)
 {
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = pmu_to_vcpu(pmu);
@@ -164,22 +174,6 @@ static bool amd_pmc_is_enabled(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static struct kvm_pmc *amd_pmc_idx_to_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, int pmc_idx)
-{
-	unsigned int base = get_msr_base(pmu, PMU_TYPE_COUNTER);
-	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = pmu_to_vcpu(pmu);
-
-	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE)) {
-		/*
-		 * The idx is contiguous. The MSRs are not. The counter MSRs
-		 * are interleaved with the event select MSRs.
-		 */
-		pmc_idx *= 2;
-	}
-
-	return get_gp_pmc_amd(pmu, base + pmc_idx, PMU_TYPE_COUNTER);
-}
-
 static bool amd_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int idx)
 {
 	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
@@ -193,15 +187,7 @@ static bool amd_is_valid_rdpmc_ecx(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int idx)
 static struct kvm_pmc *amd_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	unsigned int idx, u64 *mask)
 {
-	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
-	struct kvm_pmc *counters;
-
-	idx &= ~(3u << 30);
-	if (idx >= pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters)
-		return NULL;
-	counters = pmu->gp_counters;
-
-	return &counters[idx];
+	return amd_pmc_idx_to_pmc(vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu), idx & ~(3u << 30));
 }
 
 static bool amd_is_valid_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
-- 
2.36.1