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Message-ID: <87ee0zxi1z.fsf@redhat.com>
Date:   Thu, 12 May 2022 10:37:44 +0200
From:   Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        "Guilherme G . Piccoli" <gpiccoli@...lia.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization in an emergency
 if SVM is supported

Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> writes:

> Disable SVM on all CPUs via NMI shootdown during an emergency reboot.
> Like VMX, SVM can block INIT and thus prevent bringing up other CPUs via
> INIT-SIPI-SIPI.
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> index f9543a4e9b09..33c1f4883b27 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> @@ -533,27 +533,29 @@ static void nmi_shootdown_nop(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs)
>  	/* Nothing to do, the NMI shootdown handler disables virtualization. */
>  }
>  
> -/* Use NMIs as IPIs to tell all CPUs to disable virtualization */
> -static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void)
> +static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void)
>  {
>  	/* Just make sure we won't change CPUs while doing this */
>  	local_irq_disable();
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * Disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise we risk hanging
> -	 * the machine, because the CPU blocks INIT when it's in VMX root.
> +	 * Disable virtualization on all CPUs before rebooting to avoid hanging
> +	 * the system, as VMX and SVM block INIT when running in the host
>  	 *
>  	 * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent state, so
> -	 * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to exit VMX root and halt.
> +	 * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to disable VMX/SVM and halt.
>  	 *
> -	 * Do the NMI shootdown even if VMX if off on _this_ CPU, as that
> -	 * doesn't prevent a different CPU from being in VMX root operation.
> +	 * Do the NMI shootdown even if virtualization is off on _this_ CPU, as
> +	 * other CPUs may have virtualization enabled.
>  	 */
> -	if (cpu_has_vmx()) {
> -		/* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX root operation. */
> -		__cpu_emergency_vmxoff();
> +	if (cpu_has_vmx() || cpu_has_svm(NULL)) {
> +		/* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX/SVM operation. */
> +		if (cpu_has_vmx())
> +			__cpu_emergency_vmxoff();
> +		else
> +			cpu_emergency_svm_disable();
>  
> -		/* Halt and exit VMX root operation on the other CPUs. */
> +		/* Disable VMX/SVM and halt on other CPUs. */
>  		nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_nop);
>  	}

Nitpicking: we can get rid of the second cpu_has_vmx() if we write this
as:

	if (cpu_has_vmx())
		__cpu_emergency_vmxoff();
	else if (cpu_has_svm(NULL))
		cpu_emergency_svm_disable();
	else 
		return;

	nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_nop);

>  }
> @@ -590,7 +592,7 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_restart(void)
>  	unsigned short mode;
>  
>  	if (reboot_emergency)
> -		emergency_vmx_disable_all();
> +		emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization();
>  
>  	tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_REBOOT);

Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>

-- 
Vitaly

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