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Date:   Fri, 13 May 2022 12:02:24 +0800
From:   "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        "jmattson@...gle.com" <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        "seanjc@...gle.com" <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        "kan.liang@...ux.intel.com" <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>,
        "like.xu.linux@...il.com" <like.xu.linux@...il.com>,
        "vkuznets@...hat.com" <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        "Wang, Wei W" <wei.w.wang@...el.com>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 14/16] KVM: x86/vmx: Flip Arch LBREn bit on guest
 state change


On 5/12/2022 9:18 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 5/11/22 09:43, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
>>> Instead of using flip_arch_lbr_ctl, SMM should save the value of the MSR
>>> in kvm_x86_ops->enter_smm, and restore it in kvm_x86_ops->leave_smm
>>> (feel free to do it only if guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM), i.e.
>>> the 32-bit case can be ignored).
>> In the case of migration in SMM, I assume kvm_x86_ops->enter_smm()
>> called in source side
>>
>> and kvm_x86_ops->leave_smm() is called at destination, then should the
>> saved LBREn be transferred
>>
>> to destination too? The destination can rely on the bit to defer setting
>> LBREn bit in
> Hi, it's transferred automatically if the MSR is saved in the SMM save
> state area.  Both enter_smm and leave_smm can access the save state area.
>
> The enter_smm callback is called after saving "normal" state, and it has
> to save the state + clear the bit; likewise, the leave_smm callback is
> called before saving "normal" state and will restore the old value of
> the MSR.

Hi, I  modified this patch to consolidate your suggestion above, see 
below patch.

I added more things to ease migration handling in SMM because: 1) qemu 
checks

LBREn before transfer Arch LBR MSRs. 2)Perf event is created when LBREn 
is being

set.  Two things are not certain: 1) IA32_LBR_CTL doesn't have 
corresponding slot in

SMRAM,not sure if we need to rely on it to transfer the MSR. 2) I chose 
0x7f10 as

the offset(CET takes 0x7f08) for storage, need you double check if it's 
free or used.

Thanks a lot!

====================================================================

 From ceba1527fd87cdc789b38fce454058fca6582b0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 20:48:39 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86/vmx: Flip Arch LBREn bit on guest state change

Per spec:"IA32_LBR_CTL.LBREn is saved and cleared on #SMI, and restored
on RSM. On a warm reset, all LBR MSRs, including IA32_LBR_DEPTH, have their
values preserved. However, IA32_LBR_CTL.LBREn is cleared to 0, disabling
LBRs." Given migration in SMM, use a reserved bit(63) of the MSR to mirror
LBREn bit, it facilitates Arch LBR specific handling during live migration
because user space will check LBREn to decide whether it's necessary to
migrate the Arch LBR related MSRs. When the mirrored bit and LBREn bit are
both set, it means Arch LBR was active in SMM, so only create perf event
and defer the LBREn bit restoring to leave_smm callback.
Also clear LBREn at warm reset.

Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
---
  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c       | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h       |  1 +
  3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
index 038fdb788ccd..652601ad99ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
@@ -373,6 +373,8 @@ static bool arch_lbr_depth_is_valid(struct kvm_vcpu 
*vcpu, u64 depth)
      return (depth == pmu->kvm_arch_lbr_depth);
  }

+#define ARCH_LBR_IN_SMM    BIT(63)
+
  static bool arch_lbr_ctl_is_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 ctl)
  {
      struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
@@ -380,7 +382,7 @@ static bool arch_lbr_ctl_is_valid(struct kvm_vcpu 
*vcpu, u64 ctl)
      if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR))
          return false;

-    if (ctl & ~KVM_ARCH_LBR_CTL_MASK)
+    if (ctl & ~(KVM_ARCH_LBR_CTL_MASK | ARCH_LBR_IN_SMM))
          goto warn;

      entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1c, 0);
@@ -425,6 +427,10 @@ static int intel_pmu_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
struct msr_data *msr_info)
          return 0;
      case MSR_ARCH_LBR_CTL:
          msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL);
+        if (to_vmx(vcpu)->lbr_in_smm) {
+            msr_info->data |= ARCH_LBR_CTL_LBREN;
+            msr_info->data |= ARCH_LBR_IN_SMM;
+        }
          return 0;
      default:
          if ((pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)) ||
@@ -501,11 +507,15 @@ static int intel_pmu_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu 
*vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
          if (!arch_lbr_ctl_is_valid(vcpu, data))
              break;

-        vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL, data);
-
          if (intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu) && !lbr_desc->event &&
              (data & ARCH_LBR_CTL_LBREN))
              intel_pmu_create_guest_lbr_event(vcpu);
+
+        if (data & ARCH_LBR_IN_SMM) {
+            data &= ~ARCH_LBR_CTL_LBREN;
+            data &= ~ARCH_LBR_IN_SMM;
+        }
+        vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL, data);
          return 0;
      default:
          if ((pmc = get_gp_pmc(pmu, msr, MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)) ||
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 6d6ee9cf82f5..f754b9400151 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4543,6 +4543,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
bool init_event)

      vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
      vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
+    vmx->lbr_in_smm = false;

      vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = 0;

@@ -4593,6 +4594,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
bool init_event)
      if (!init_event) {
          if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR))
              vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL, 0);
+    } else {
+        flip_arch_lbr_ctl(vcpu, false);
      }
  }

@@ -7695,6 +7698,8 @@ static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
bool for_injection)

  static int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
  {
+    struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+    struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
      struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);

      vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = is_guest_mode(vcpu);
@@ -7704,12 +7709,26 @@ static int vmx_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
char *smstate)
      vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = vmx->nested.vmxon;
      vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
      vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+
+    if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR) &&
+        test_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use) &&
+        lbr_desc->event && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) {
+        u64 ctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL);
+
+        put_smstate(u64, smstate, 0x7f10, ctl);
+        vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL, ctl & ~ARCH_LBR_CTL_LBREN);
+        vmx->lbr_in_smm = true;
+    }
+
      return 0;
  }

  static int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
  {
+    struct lbr_desc *lbr_desc = vcpu_to_lbr_desc(vcpu);
+    struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
      struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
      int ret;

      if (vmx->nested.smm.vmxon) {
@@ -7725,6 +7744,16 @@ static int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, 
const char *smstate)
          vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
          vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = false;
      }
+
+    if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR) &&
+        test_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, pmu->pmc_in_use) &&
+        lbr_desc->event && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM)) {
+        u64 ctl = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7f10);
+
+        vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_LBR_CTL, ctl | ARCH_LBR_CTL_LBREN);
+        vmx->lbr_in_smm = false;
+    }
+
      return 0;
  }

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index b98c7e96697a..a227fe8bf288 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {

      struct pt_desc pt_desc;
      struct lbr_desc lbr_desc;
+    bool lbr_in_smm;

      /* Save desired MSR intercept (read: pass-through) state */
  #define MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS    15
-- 
2.27.0

>
> Thanks,
>
> Paolo
>
>> VMCS until kvm_x86_ops->leave_smm() is called. is it good? thanks!

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