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Message-ID: <Yn5eVA07T4oTkTLl@suse.de>
Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 15:34:12 +0200
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
To: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@...group.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as
syscall gap
Hi,
On Tue, Apr 12, 2022 at 08:49:08PM +0800, Lai Jiangshan wrote:
> From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@...group.com>
>
> When returning to user space, the %rsp is user controlled value.
>
> If it is SNP-guest and the hypervisor decides to mess with the code-page
> for this path while a CPU is executing it. This will cause a #VC on
> that CPU and that could hit in the syscall return path and mislead
> the #VC handler.
>
> So make ip_within_syscall_gap() return true in this case.
With the SNP guest patches in tip-tree I think it actually becomes
possible that a #VC exception hits in these parts of the execution
stream. It requires good timing by the attacker, but it is not
impossible. Therefore:
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
--
Jörg Rödel
jroedel@...e.de
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
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Germany
(HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg)
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