| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 16:57:04 +0200
From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: kernel@...gutronix.de, Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>,
Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@....com>,
Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@...tq-group.com>,
Michael Walle <michael@...le.cc>,
John Ernberg <john.ernberg@...ia.se>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v10 6/7] doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic
Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
---
v9 -> v10:
- no change
v8 -> v9:
- add Jarkko's Reviewed-by
v7 -> v8:
- add Pankaj's Reviewed-by
v6 -> v7:
- docs update split off as new Patch (Jarkko)
- fixed typo in "Trusted Keys usage: CAAM" section
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@....com>
Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>
Cc: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@....com>
Cc: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@...tq-group.com>
Cc: Michael Walle <michael@...le.cc>
Cc: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@...ia.se>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
---
.../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 2fe6fd1a2bbd..0bfb4c339748 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ safe.
Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
fuses and is accessible to TEE only.
+ (3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs)
+
+ When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
+ mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
+ randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
+ Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.
+
* Execution isolation
(1) TPM
@@ -46,6 +53,10 @@ safe.
Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.
+ (3) CAAM
+
+ Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.
+
* Optional binding to platform integrity state
(1) TPM
@@ -63,6 +74,11 @@ safe.
Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
be extended with TEE based measured boot process.
+ (3) CAAM
+
+ Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
+ for platform integrity.
+
* Interfaces and APIs
(1) TPM
@@ -74,10 +90,13 @@ safe.
TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``.
+ (3) CAAM
+
+ Interface is specific to silicon vendor.
* Threat model
- The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM or TEE for a given
+ The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given
purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.
@@ -104,6 +123,12 @@ selected trust source:
from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.
+ * CAAM: Kernel RNG
+
+ The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the
+ CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device
+ is probed.
+
Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel
command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool.
@@ -193,6 +218,19 @@ Usage::
specific to TEE device implementation. The key length for new keys is always
in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
+Trusted Keys usage: CAAM
+------------------------
+
+Usage::
+
+ keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
+ keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
+ keyctl print keyid
+
+"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a
+CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
+Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
+
Encrypted Keys usage
--------------------
--
2.30.2
Powered by blists - more mailing lists