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Message-ID: <CD2EB6FA-E17F-45BA-AC70-92CCB12A16C4@nutanix.com>
Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 03:19:08 +0000
From: Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>
To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
CC: Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
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Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
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"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kvm @ vger . kernel . org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] x86/speculation, KVM: remove IBPB on vCPU load
> On May 12, 2022, at 11:06 PM, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 12, 2022 at 5:50 PM Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com> wrote:
>
>> You mentioned if someone was concerned about performance, are you
>> saying they also critically care about performance, such that they are
>> willing to *not* use IBPB at all, and instead just use taskset and hope
>> nothing ever gets scheduled on there, and then hope that the hypervisor
>> does the job for them?
>
> I am saying that IBPB is not the only viable mitigation for
> cross-process indirect branch steering. Proper scheduling can also
> solve the problem, without the overhead of IBPB. Say that you have two
> security domains: trusted and untrusted. If you have a two-socket
> system, and you always run trusted workloads on socket#0 and untrusted
> workloads on socket#1, IBPB is completely superfluous. However, if the
> hypervisor chooses to schedule a vCPU thread from virtual socket#0
> after a vCPU thread from virtual socket#1 on the same logical
> processor, then it *must* execute an IBPB between those two vCPU
> threads. Otherwise, it has introduced a non-architectural
> vulnerability that the guest can't possibly be aware of.
>
> If you can't trust your OS to schedule tasks where you tell it to
> schedule them, can you really trust it to provide you with any kind of
> inter-process security?
Fair enough, so going forward:
Should this be mandatory in all cases? How this whole effort came
was that a user could configure their KVM host with conditional
IBPB, but this particular mitigation is now always on no matter what.
In our previous patch review threads, Sean and I mostly settled on making
this particular avenue active only when a user configures always_ibpb, such
that for cases like the one you describe (and others like it that come up in
the future) can be covered easily, but for cond_ibpb, we can document
that it doesn’t cover this case.
Would that be acceptable here?
>
>> Would this be the expectation of just KVM? Or all hypervisors on the
>> market?
>
> Any hypervisor that doesn't do this is broken, but that won't keep it
> off the market. :-)
Very true :)
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