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Message-ID: <YoNUmF3+lVxIjoik@alley>
Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 09:54:00 +0200
From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: remove get_random_bytes_arch() and add
rng_has_arch_random()
On Sat 2022-05-14 13:23:07, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> The RNG incorporates RDRAND into its state at boot and every time it
> reseeds, so there's no reason for callers to use it directly. The
> hashing that the RNG does on it is preferable to using the bytes raw.
>
> The only current use case of it is vsprintf's siphash key for pointer
> hashing, which uses it to initialize the pointer secret earlier than
> usual if RDRAND is available. In order to replace this narrow use case,
> just expose whether RDRAND is available. With that taken care of, there
> are no users of get_random_bytes_arch() left, so the function can be
> removed.
>
> Later if trust_cpu gets turned on by default (as most distros are
> doing), this one use of rng_has_arch_random() can probably go away as
> well.
>
> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>
> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Looks good to me. Thanks for the clean up.
Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com> # for vsprintf.c
Best Regards,
Petr
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