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Message-ID: <412bf136-6a5b-f442-1e84-778697e2b694@fb.com>
Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 09:34:22 -0700
From: Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
To: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf v3 1/2] bpf_trace: check size for overflow in
bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach
On 5/18/22 5:22 AM, Eugene Syromiatnikov wrote:
> Check that size would not overflow before calculation (and return
> -EOVERFLOW if it will), to prevent potential out-of-bounds write
> with the following copy_from_user. Add the same check
> to kprobe_multi_resolve_syms in case it will be called from elsewhere
> in the future.
>
> Fixes: 0dcac272540613d4 ("bpf: Add multi kprobe link")
> Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>
> ---
> kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 13 ++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> index d8553f4..212faa4 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> @@ -2352,13 +2352,15 @@ static int
> kprobe_multi_resolve_syms(const void __user *usyms, u32 cnt,
> unsigned long *addrs)
> {
> - unsigned long addr, size;
> + unsigned long addr, sym_size;
> + u32 size;
> const char __user **syms;
> int err = -ENOMEM;
> unsigned int i;
> char *func;
>
> - size = cnt * sizeof(*syms);
> + if (check_mul_overflow(cnt, (u32)sizeof(*syms), &size))
> + return -EOVERFLOW;
In mm/util.c kvmalloc_node(), we have
/* Don't even allow crazy sizes */
if (unlikely(size > INT_MAX)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(flags & __GFP_NOWARN));
return NULL;
}
Basically the maximum size to be allocated in INT_MAX.
Here, we have 'size' as u32, which means if the size is 0xffff0000,
the check_mul_overflow will return false (no overflow) but
kvzalloc will still have a warning.
I think we should change the type of 'size' to be 'int' which
should catch the above case and be consistent with
what kvmalloc_node() intends to warn.
> syms = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!syms)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -2382,9 +2384,9 @@ kprobe_multi_resolve_syms(const void __user *usyms, u32 cnt,
> addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func);
> if (!addr)
> goto error;
> - if (!kallsyms_lookup_size_offset(addr, &size, NULL))
> + if (!kallsyms_lookup_size_offset(addr, &sym_size, NULL))
> goto error;
> - addr = ftrace_location_range(addr, addr + size - 1);
> + addr = ftrace_location_range(addr, addr + sym_size - 1);
> if (!addr)
> goto error;
> addrs[i] = addr;
> @@ -2429,7 +2431,8 @@ int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pr
> if (!cnt)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - size = cnt * sizeof(*addrs);
> + if (check_mul_overflow(cnt, (u32)sizeof(*addrs), &size))
> + return -EOVERFLOW;
> addrs = kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!addrs)
> return -ENOMEM;
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