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Message-Id: <20220519153713.819591-4-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 23:37:08 +0800
From: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
To: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
qemu-devel@...gnu.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
"Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
luto@...nel.org, jun.nakajima@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
ak@...ux.intel.com, david@...hat.com, aarcange@...hat.com,
ddutile@...hat.com, dhildenb@...hat.com,
Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, mhocko@...e.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 3/8] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag
Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the
created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU
access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be
accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. KVM MMU) indirectly.
It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support
that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as the
source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such
as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace.
The flag can not coexist with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, future sealing is
also impossible for a memfd created with this flag.
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 +
mm/memfd.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
index 7a8a26751c23..48750474b904 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
#define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
#define MFD_HUGETLB 0x0004U
+#define MFD_INACCESSIBLE 0x0008U
/*
* Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
index 08f5f8304746..775541d53f1b 100644
--- a/mm/memfd.c
+++ b/mm/memfd.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/memfd.h>
+#include <linux/memfile_notifier.h>
#include <uapi/linux/memfd.h>
/*
@@ -261,7 +262,8 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
#define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1)
#define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN)
-#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB)
+#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | \
+ MFD_INACCESSIBLE)
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
const char __user *, uname,
@@ -283,6 +285,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* Disallow sealing when MFD_INACCESSIBLE is set. */
+ if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE && flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* length includes terminating zero */
len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1);
if (len <= 0)
@@ -329,12 +335,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) {
file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file);
*file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
+ } else if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE) {
+ error = memfile_node_set_flags(file,
+ MEMFILE_F_USER_INACCESSIBLE);
+ if (error)
+ goto err_file;
}
fd_install(fd, file);
kfree(name);
return fd;
+err_file:
+ fput(file);
err_fd:
put_unused_fd(fd);
err_name:
--
2.25.1
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